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The appellee/cross-appellant, Jackie Turner, pursuant to 
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the 
following Reply Brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves appeals by the Inteldex appellants and 
GAB and a cross-appeal by Jackie Turner. Rule 24(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
brief". As such, this Reply Brief will address only the three 
issues raised by Jackie Turner's cross-appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to consider 
mental and emotional suffering as a proper element of damage in a 
fraud case? 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing the jury to hear 
evidence about Jackie Turner's alleged past drug use and her entire 
emotional and psychiatric history, including childhood sexual abuse 
and recent psychiatric hospitalization? 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant a new 
trial or amend the judgment notwithstanding the verdict to have the 
issue of damages submitted to a jury? 
Jackie Turner will not again address the issues of 
whether the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on Turner's claims of fraud, invasion of privacy, and 
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conspiracy and whether the trial court erred in awarding punitive 
damages. Those issues are addressed in Turner's initial Brief. 
POINT I 
(Replying to Inteldex Point B-l and GAB Point V) 
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL SUFFERING ARE PROPER 
ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE IN A FRAUD CASE 
This Court has an opportunity in this appeal to decide 
whether mental and emotional suffering is a proper element of 
damage in a fraud case. This issue has not been directly addressed 
by this Court in past fraud decisions. Defendants rely upon Duaan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) , as support for the "benefit of 
the bargain11 rule. However, mental and emotional suffering were 
not addressed in that decision. Duaan was a case involving a real 
property transaction. No emotional element was presented. Duaan 
defined the measure of damage in a fraud case as "the difference 
between the value of the property purchased and the value it would 
have had, if the representations were true". Id. at 1247. This 
restrictive definition loses its meaning when applied in a non real 
property context. It should not, therefore, govern this appeal. 
In this Reply Brief, Ms. Turner can list even more fraud 
cases, in addition to those cited in her initial brief, in which 
emotional distress damages have been awarded. For example, Captain 
& Co. v. Stenbera. 505 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. App. 1987) ("Here we have 
held the Stenbergs can recover under a fraud theory. They may, 
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therefore, recover damages for emotional distress."); Kneip v. 
Unitedbank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App. 1987) (•• mental 
anguish damages are recoverable for intentional torts.... Fraud in 
the inducement is, of course, an intentional tort.") 
But simply citing fraud cases in which emotional distress 
damages have been awarded doesn't sufficiently explain why such 
damages should be awarded. That inquiry requires a thorough review 
of the reasons and policies behind awarding emotional distress 
damages• 
Fortunately, a thorough analysis of this issue was 
undertaken by Professor Andrew L. Merritt of the University of 
Illinois College of Law in his well-reasoned law review article, 
Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation; Dianitarv Torts 
in a Commercial Society, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1989) . That article, 
and its review of policy, case law, and commentary, are directly on 
point with this issue on appeal. It is therefore reproduced, in 
its entirety, in the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
In that article, Professor Merritt discusses the existing 
case law on this issue: 
The proper measure of fraud damages always has 
been a matter of controversy.... Relatively 
few cases have considered the propriety of 
awarding damages for non-pecuniary loss.... 
Though a substantial body of precedent now 
addresses this issue, no judicial consensus 
has emerged. 
Id. at 3. 
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While acknowledging that the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and commentators generally support denial of emotional 
distress damages to fraud victims, the article acknowledges case 
law support for both awarding and denying such damages and then 
states: 
To label either of these lines of precedent as 
a firm majority rule would be inaccurate. 
Certainty most reported decisions measure 
fraud damages by economic loss rather than 
emotional harm. In most of these cases, 
however, no indication exists that any party 
requested emotional distress damages or that 
the court consciously considered the issue. 
These decisions, therefore, do not represent 
holdings in opposition to recovery for 
emotional distress in fraud cases. Among 
cases that have specifically addressed the 
issue, neither a clear majority rule, nor a 
decided trend in either direction has 
emerged.... Thus, the "black letter" law dis-
cerned by the Restatement and some comment-
ators fades upon close examination of the case 
law. 
Id. at 4-5. 
Professor Merritt later addresses the policy issues, too 
often ignored by courts, to be examined in deciding this issue: 
Compensation for a wrongfully inflicted injury 
is a basic tort policy. Courts should deny 
damages for emotional distress in fraud cases, 
therefore, only if a persuasive policy reason 
for denial exists. Three possible interests 
bear upon the availability of these damages: 
(1) the needs of potential plaintiffs; (2) the 
concerns of potential defendants; and (3) 
society's interest in an efficient court 
system. 
Id. at 23. 
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Merritt reviews those first two policy issues and 
concludes: 
The concerns of the defendants in fraud cases 
do not override the plaintiff's need for 
compensation. To win a fraud case, the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant 
intentionally deceived the plaintiff. An 
intentional swindler is in a poor position to 
argue that it is unfair to compensate fully 
the plaintiff's loss; thus, tort law's twin 
goals of deterrence and compensation combine 
to support the award of emotional distress 
damages against perpetrators of intentional 
fraud. 
Id. at 25-26. 
Merritt then addresses the final policy issue, regarding 
an efficient court system: 
Finally, society's interest in efficient 
judicial administration does not counsel 
denying damages for emotional distress. 
Awarding these damages will not open the 
judicial floodgates to an entirely new class 
of claims; plaintiffs already bring fraud 
suits focusing on the pecuniary harm that they 
have suffered. Nor would expanding the range 
of damages for fraud pose a serious risk of 
manufactured claims; in numerous other areas 
of tort law, courts already trust jurors to 
evaluate the genuineness of such claims. 
Finally, it is unlikely that allowing damages 
for emotional distress in fraud cases will 
burden the courts with trivial lawsuits. 
Claims of trivial distress will receive 
trivial damage awards. Few plaintiffs will 
wish to pay the legal bills for initiating 
such claims, and attorneys will not be willing 
to undertake these claims for a contingent 
fee. 
Id. at 27. 
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Based on a detailed analysis of each of these policy 
issues, Professor Merritt concludes: 
Balancing these interests suggests that, as a 
general rule, emotional distress damages 
should be awarded in fraud actions• 
Id. at 23. 
Jackie Turner is not attempting to turn this into a claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She simply 
argues for the basic tort principle that a plaintiff should be 
fully compensated for all damages proximately caused by a 
wrongfully inflicted injury. The defendants continue to assert 
that fraud is a cause of action involving "economic deception", not 
personal injury. While that may often be true, what happens when 
the fraud does not primarily involve economic deception? Under 
those circumstances, the defendants1 position would simply leave 
the plaintiff without a remedy even when all elements of fraud, 
except out of pocket loss, have been established. Such a position 
opens the door for abuse, protecting any defrauder who limits 
damages to emotional loss, rather than pecuniary loss. As 
Professor Merritt explains, "the distinction between business fraud 
and non-business fraud is not a reliable basis for reconciling the 
conflicting case law in this area". Id. at 12. Even if it were, 
this case represents "personal" or "non-business" fraud for which 
emotional distress damages are generally allowed. Id. at 10. 
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For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Turner's 
initial Brief, the trial court's refusal to allow mental and 
emotional suffering as a proper element of damage for fraud was 
error. If this Court remands this case for retrial, mental and 
emotional damages for fraud should be allowed. Even if this Court 
affirms the JNOV of the trial court, this issue should be addressed 
for future fraud cases in Utah. 
POINT II 
(Replying to Inteldex Point B-2 and GAB Point VI) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE 
OF JACKIE TURNER'S ALLEGED PAST DRUG 
USE AND THE ENTIRETY OF HER PAST EMOTIONAL 
AND PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
The "fact of consequence" in determining the damages 
issue in this case is how the investigation affected Jackie Turner, 
financially and emotionally. Her entire life's alleged drug use, 
sexual abuse, and psychiatric history is not relevant to that 
limited inquiry. All that is relevant are her reactions and 
emotions after that realization. How her past experiences may 
have affected those reactions and emotions is also irrelevant. It 
is a basic tenet of tort law that the defendants take the plaintiff 
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as they find her. If her damages are affected by her past physical 
or emotional condition, that is the defendants' problem. Ms. 
Turner made it clear at trial that she was not blaming these 
defendants for all the problems created by her previous life 
experiences. By that time, however, the jury had heard so much 
devastating information that it didn't matter what Turner said. 
She shouldn't have had to explain all of that in the first place. 
She just wanted to explain how the investigation affected her 
without having to address irrelevant emotional issues. 
Even if this Court finds those issues marginally 
relevant, their probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect they had on the jury. Utah Rule of Evidence 403. The 
effect on the jury of the admission of such prejudicial evidence 
was explained by this Court in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 
494 (Utah 1985): 
The erroneous admission of the testimony might 
be compared to a drop of ink placed in a 
vessel of milk. It cannot long be seen, but 
it surely remains to pollute its contents. 
The admission of this evidence did have "a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict". In re Estate of Hock. 
655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982). As shown by the trial court's JNOV on 
the liability issues, and the evidence marshalled by Turner in 
support of that ruling, reasonable minds could not differ on the 
defendants' liability in this case. The only explanation for the 
jury's verdict on liability is that the jury was improperly 
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prejudiced by the testimony regarding Turner's alleged drug use, 
sexual abuse, and psychiatric treatment. 
Finally, the privilege exception of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
25a-8(2)(f) does not apply to this case. Turner does not argue 
that the admission of this evidence breached the psychologist -
patient privilege. She argues that the evidence was improperly 
admitted because it was irrelevant under Rule 401 or, even if 
marginally relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative under 
Rule 403. 
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Turner's 
initial Brief, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
Turner's alleged past drug use, sexual abuse, and psychiatric 
history. If this Court remands this case, that evidence should be 
excluded. 
POINT III 
(Replying to Inteldex Point B-3 and GAB Point VII) 
DAMAGES ONLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY ON REMAND 
Inteldex inaccurately and unfairly represents what 
happened procedurally right after the verdict and then at hearing 
on Turner's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Turner's trial counsel did not go to the judge right after the 
verdict and request that the jury be sent out to determine damages, 
despite the jury's finding of no liability. What happened is best 
found in the record: 
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THE COURT: 
MR. JENSEN: 
MR, BARLOW: 
Mr. Jensen, you want the benefit of the 
record? 
Yeah. Judge, I don't want to belabor all of 
this. Just to get the procedure, as best I 
understand it on the record, I want to put it 
down that the jury came back; they found no 
fraud and they found no invasion of privacy. 
We had made motions for a directed verdict on 
the liability issues, fraud and invasion of 
privacy particularly, which the Court had 
taken under advisement. 
After the verdict was read, we approached the 
bench and I asked the Court as to whether that 
was still under advisement or whether the 
Court would rule on those now, thinking that 
if the Court would rule on the motions for a 
directed verdict and find that those had been 
established by the evidence, either the fraud 
or invasion of privacy claim, then the issue 
of damages would be submitted to the jury 
before they were discharged. And after 
discussion at the bench, the Judge said, I 
still have those understand [sic] advisement 
and that I can made whatever post trial 
motions may be appropriate, and that the jury 
would be released at that time. And that's 
what happened. 
Sounds fair to me. 
MR. JENSEN: Is that fair? 
THE COURT: I have no problem with it. 
MR. STEVENS: That's my recollection of it, your Honor. 
(T. 534, lines 6-25; 535, lines 1-8). 
Turner's trial counsel's request was not "unusual". It 
was appropriate procedure. The trial judge had taken under 
advisement Turner's motions for directed verdict on the liability 
issues. After the verdict, Turner's counsel asked the judge for a 
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ruling on those directed verdict motions, not just to submit the 
damages claim to the jury. If the trial judge had granted those 
motions at that time, as he ultimately did weeks later in his JNOV, 
the damages issue could have been submitted to the jury and this 
appeal issue would have been avoided. 
Similarly, Inteldex doesn't present the whole picture of 
what happened at the JNOV hearing. The transcript quote cited by 
Inteldex makes it look like Turner's counsel had no legal basis for 
arguing that the damages claim should be submitted to the jury. 
The full exchange was a follows: 
THE COURT: You say I have three choices here counsel. 
Why do you say only three? If I find in favor 
of you, can't — if I send this back to a 
jury, can't I grant damages right now? 
MR. JENSEN: I suppose my position would be, if damages 
were granted on the fraud claim, for example 
of $20 bucks or something, that even if it's a 
nominal amount, that a nominal award on the 
fraud claim would also overate the basis for 
us to pursue a punitive damage claim. And 
that issue would have to go to jury. 
THE COURT: Why does it have to go to the jury? 
MR. JENSEN: I don't know. I don't know, Judge. 
(T. of H., page 19, lines 9-22). 
At that specific moment, when asked by the judge why the 
judge couldn't just award damages, Turner's counsel was unable to 
respond with legal authority as to why the claim must be submitted 
to the jury. As such, he honestly responded that he didn't know of 
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such authority at that time. That doesn't preclude Turner from 
raising that legal authority on appeal. 
The issue was raised in the trial court. Counsel has now 
provided the legal authority that a trial court is foreclosed from 
rendering judgment notwithstanding the verdict on an issue not 
raised in a motion for directed verdict. Pollesche v. Transamerica 
Insurance Co.. 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972). Jackie Turner 
did not move for directed verdict on damages. Judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict cannot be granted on that issue. 
It is appropriate for this Court to remand the case on 
damages alone. Inteldex and GAB cite Hvland v. St. Mark's 
Hospital. 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967) to support their 
argument that both liability and damages must be resubmitted to the 
jury. In Hyland, however, this Court stated: 
There are undoubtedly some instances where 
limiting a trial to the issue of damages only 
may be justified, as our rules allow. 
Id. at 137. 
In fact, in Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), 
this Court specifically authorized a trial on damages only. Nelson 
was a negligence action resulting from a car wreck which had been 
tried twice. The first jury awarded $12,000 damages, but 
apportioned fault equally between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
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The second jury found the defendant 100% liable for the plaintiffs 
injuries and awarded damages of over $150,000. On appeal, this 
Court concluded that remand for a trial on damages only was the 
appropriate remedy. 
Even in Hyland, this Court stated that it is when the 
"questions relating to the plaintiff's injury, how it happened, who 
was at fault, and the pain and injury occasioned thereby, are so 
intermingled that if there a new trial, in fairness to both parties 
it should be on all issues". Id. at 738. Those issues are not so 
intermingled in this case that retrial on all issues is required. 
In this case, the trial court granted judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on all liability issues. By definition 
that means that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to 
be determined by the evidence or that reasonable minds could only 
find one way on the facts. Management Committee v. Gravstone 
Pines. Inc. , 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Roy lance v. Davies, 18 Utah 
2d 395, 429 P.2d 142 (1967); Koer v. Mavfair Markets. 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 565 (1967). As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court: 
When liability is conceded or the evidence 
relative thereto undisputed, it is, of course, 
clear that the question of damages is 
separable and can be determined alone without 
injustice to the other party. 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gastelorn, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P. 719, 725 
(1929) . 
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Finally, if this case is remanded on both liability and 
damages issues, Jackie Turner will simply move again for directed 
verdict on all liability issues at the end of the second trial. 
Under the "law of the case" doctrine, the trial court would be 
governed by its previous judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
assuming the evidence at the second trial is the same as the 
evidence at the first trial. That evidence will be the same 
because the defendants have already testified under oath to the 
nature of the Turner investigation. The "law of case" doctrine is 
explained in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 
P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): 
The purpose of this doctrine is that in the 
interest of economy of time and efficiency of 
procedure, it is desirable to avoid delays and 
the difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and ruling upon the same 
propositions in the same case. (Citations 
omitted). Although a trial court is not 
inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior 
relevant rulings made in the same case are 
generally to be followed. 
Id. at 45. 
Jackie Turner wishes to avoid the waste of judicial time 
of retrial on the liability issues already decided by the trial 
court. The damages issue in this case is severable from the 
liability issues. The jury should simply be instructed regarding 
the nature of the defendants' liability. They will then be able to 
independently address damages. 
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For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Jackie 
Turner's initial brief, this case should be remanded to the jury 
only for the determination of the amount of damages sustained by 
Turner as a result of the defendants' fraud, invasion of privacy, 
and conspiracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Case law and policy considerations support awarding 
mental and emotional suffering damages for fraud. The trial 
court's conclusion that such damages are not available in a fraud 
case was error. If this Court remands this case for retrial, 
mental and emotional damages for fraud should be allowed. If this 
court affirms the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict without remand, this Court should still allow mental and 
emotional damages in future fraud cases in Utah. This issue should 
be decided by this Court at this time. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of Jackie Turner's 
alleged past drug use and entire emotional and psychiatric history. 
Even if marginally relevant, it was highly prejudicial and had an 
effect on the jury's verdict. If this case is remanded, that 
evidence should not be submitted to the jury. 
Finally, this case should be remanded to a jury solely 
for the determination of the appropriate measure of damages to be 
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awarded to Jackie Turner. Liability and damages issues are not so 
intermingled that a new trial on all issues is required. The trial 
court's JNOV on liability evidences that reasonable minds could not 
differ on the defendants' liability. As such, the defendants are 
not disadvantaged by having the case remanded on damages only. 
DATED this fj day of September, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant 
BY: At. li f'J-
GLEN A. COOK 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most dynamic developments in modern tort law has 
been the increased focus on damages for emotional distress. During the 
past few decades courts have fashioned several new tort theories to al-
low recovery of emotional distress damages as independent causes of 
action.1 At the same time, lobbyists and legislators have attacked these 
damages for contributing to "runaway" jury verdicts. As a result of 
these attacks, a growing number of states are enacting statutes that 
limit recovery of emotional distress damages in traditional tort areas 
such as medical malpractice.2 Thus, damages for emotional distress are 
at a crossroads between broad trends of expansion and contraction. 
One largely unexplored battleground for these conflicting trends is 
the awarding of emotional distress damages in commercial tort cases, 
particularly in cases of fraud and deceit. No judicial consensus exists on 
the propriety of awarding damages for emotional distress in fraud cases. 
Many jurisdictions limit damages for fraud to pecuniary injuries; this 
view has had the most influence on legal commentators and treatise 
writers.3 Nevertheless, a substantial group of jurisdictions has awarded 
emotional distress damages in fraud cases.4 Few of the decisions on ei-
ther side of this issue have examined closely other jurisdictions' treat-
ment of the issue, and most of these decisions have not analyzed the 
policies favoring or opposing the award of emotional distress damages 
in fraud cases. Perhaps this lack of detailed consideration in the case 
law has been the greatest hindrance to the development of a judicial 
consensus. 
1. See infra notes 76-78, 106-10, 146 and accompanying text. 
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1988) (placing a $250,000 ceiling on awards 
for noneconomic losses, including pain and suffering, in medical negligence cases); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 549.23 (West 1988) (placing $200,000 cap on damages for intangible loss in any civil action); 
cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987) (limiting total damages in medical malpractice cases 
to one million dollars). For further discussion, see also statutes cited infra note 147. 
3. See infra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
4. See cases cited infra note 11. 
1989] DIGNITARY TORTS 3 
This Article has two purposes. First, it seeks to direct attention to 
an important but rarely noted conflict among the jurisdictions in defin-
ing damages for fraud. Second, the Article attempts to supply the per-
spective of precedent and policy that is lacking in the opinions that 
address this issue. Part II of this Article discusses the varying ap-
proaches that courts have taken in deciding whether to award emo-
tional distress damages in fraud litigation. Part III of the Article 
highlights the practical difference between allowing recovery for emo-
tional distress as an element of damages for fraud and relegating plain-
tiffs to other tort theories of recovery for emotional distress. Part IV 
first examines, as a general matter, whether courts should allow the 
awarding of emotional distress damages in fraud cases. After concluding 
that policy concerns generally favor granting such damages, Part IV 
then considers whether courts should adopt any of the qualified ap-
proaches to the availability of such damages. This Article concludes 
that inflexible distinctions between "personal" torts and "commercial" 
torts are unrealistic in a modern consumer society. Thus, the Article 
urges courts to recognize fraud as a dignitary tort that justifies the 
awarding of emotional distress damages. 
II. THE CONFLICT IN COMMON-LAW PRECEDENT: A "BLACKLETTER" 
RULE IN INVISIBLE INK 
The proper measure of fraud damages always has been a matter of 
controversy. Most of the argument has centered on the proper way to 
recompense a plaintiffs pecuniary losses. Courts have long split over 
whether the plaintiffs should recover the benefit of their bargain or 
whether recovery should be limited to out-of-pocket loss.6 Relatively 
few cases have considered the propriety of awarding damages for non-
pecuniary loss. Increasingly, however, defrauded plaintiffs are seeking 
to supplement their recovery for monetary losses with recovery for emo-
tional distress. Though a substantial body of precedent now addresses 
this issue, no judicial consensus has emerged. 
A. Two Conflicting Rules 
Commentators believe that emotional distress damages generally 
should not be recovered in fraud cases. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts {Restatement) defines the appropriate recovery for plaintiffs in 
fraud cases solely in terms of "pecuniary" losses.6 Similarly, a leading 
5. Compare Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125 (1889) (adopting an out-of-pocket measure) and 
Beardmore v. T.D. Burgess Co., 245 Md. 387, 226 A.2d 329 (1967) with Kinsey v. Scott, 124 111. 
App. 3d 329, 341, 463 N.E.2d 1359, 1367 (1984) (using a benefit of the bargain standard). 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
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treatise on remedies concludes that "separate recovery for mental 
anguish is usually denied in deceit cases."7 Thus, the "blackletter" law 
appears to deny fraud plaintiffs recovery for emotional distress. 
The history of emotional distress damages in fraud litigation, how-
ever, is marked by disagreement rather than accord. Since at least the 
turn of the century, courts have taken radically different approaches to 
the awarding of damages for fraud. Cable v. Bowlus* is perhaps the ear-
liest American case specifically addressing the issue. In Cable an Ohio 
court declared that a plaintiff who was defrauded into purchasing stock 
in a gold mining company could not recover for his "feelings, disap-
pointment, or disgrace."9 In 1912 a Pennsylvania court reached a con-
trary result in a real estate fraud case, allowing the jury to award "an 
amount sufficient to compensate the plaintiff, in a reasonable measure, 
for his trouble, vexation and annoyance."10 Subsequent decisions have 
added to both lines of precedent.11 
To label either of these lines of precedent as a firm majority rule 
would be inaccurate. Certainly most reported decisions measure fraud 
damages by economic loss rather than emotional harm. In most of these 
cases, however, no indication exists that any party requested emotional 
distress damages or that the court consciously considered the issue.12 
7. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2, at 602 (1973). For a contrasting 
view, see R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 147-52 (1988) (recognizing the conflict in the 
case law and urging that recovery for emotional distress is appropriate). 
8. 21 Ohio C.C. 53 (1900). 
9. Id. at 54 (syllabus by the court). 
10. Schusler v. Clark, 50 Pa. Super. 459, 466 (1912). 
11. Jurisdictions that specifically have addressed the award of emotional distress damages 
are divided almost evenly between those denying recovery and those supporting recovery. For pre-
cedent denying recovery, see Moore v. Slonim, 426 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Conn.) (applying Con-
necticut law), aff'd mem., 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977); Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp., 187 F. 
Supp. 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (applying New York law); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 
711-12, 682 P.2d 1247, 1258-59 (1983); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987); 
Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb. 699, 710-11, 61 N.W.2d 265, 272 (1953); Carrigg v. Blue, 283 S.C. 494, 
497 n.l, 323 S.E.2d 787, 789 n.l (Ct. App. 1984). For precedent permitting recovery, see Holcombe 
v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 434, 318 So. 2d 289, 293 (1975); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 
Cal. App. 3d 740, 755, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 246 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981); 
Trimble v. City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 730 (Colo. 1985); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 
150, 154-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Captain & Co. v. Stenberg, 505 N.E.2d 88, 100 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1987); Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 124 N.H. 814, 818-19, 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (1984); 
McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 178-79, 646 P.2d 771, 775-76 (1982), aff'd, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 
676 P.2d 496 (1984); cf. Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 480, 
485 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (allowing damages for emotional distress under Ohio law, at least for "mali-
cious" fraud). Two jurisdictions contain conflicting precedents. See cases cited infra note 15. The 
status of the law in some jurisdictions is difficult to classify. One court, for example, has stated 
that Missouri law would deny emotional distress damages in fraud cases, but has qualified that 
opinion as being inapplicable to tortfeasors who acted "willfully"—an exception that would seem 
to include most cases of fraud. Walsh v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 656 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1981). 
12. See, e.g., Posner v. Davis, 76 111. App. 3d 638, 395 N.E.2d 133 (1979) (assuming that 
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These decisions, therefore, do not represent holdings in opposition to 
recovery for emotional distress in fraud cases. Among the cases that 
specifically have addressed the issue, neither a clear majority rule13 nor 
a decided trend in either direction has emerged.14 Indeed, in some juris-
dictions a litigant could point to precedent supporting either conclu-
sion.16 Thus, the "blackletter" law discerned by the Restatement and 
some commentators fades upon close examination of the case law. 
The courts themselves have paid little attention to either the con-
flicting precedents that support and reject fraud damages for emotional 
distress or the policies underlying those results. Most cases simply as-
sert a rule. Thus, typical decisions denying recovery state only that 
"courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that damages for 
mental anguish, humiliation, pain and suffering are not recoverable in 
an action for fraud";16 or that "[i]nconvenience is no more proper as an 
element of damage in such [a] case than it would be in an action for 
breach of warranty."17 Cases awarding emotional distress damages can 
be equally cryptic; many of these cases also fail to acknowledge the con-
flict among jurisdictions or to engage in any policy analysis.18 
plaintiffs in a fraudulent property sale case should have introduced evidence of the monetary value 
of their efforts to clean up a water-logged basement); Lobe Enters, v. Dotsen, 360 N.W.2d 371, 373 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (stating that a defrauded party 
may recover the benefit of his bargain plus any additional damages that are a natural and proxi-
mate consequence of the defendant's misrepresentations). 
13. See supra note 11. 
14. An "old" rule and a "new" rule on this issue apparently do not exist. Courts addressing 
the issue within the past several years have added support to both lines of precedent. See supra 
note 11. 
15. Compare Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 52, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (1969) (denying recovery) 
and Hudson & Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (denying 
recovery), overruled by United Plastics, Co. v. Dyes, 588 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) with 
Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795, 806 (D. Haw.) (allowing recovery), aff'd, 297 F.2d 702, 729-31 
(9th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) and Kneip v. Unitedbank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 
130, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing recovery). California courts generally award emotional dis-
tress damages in fraud actions, see, e.g., Jahn v. Brickey, 168 Cal. App. 3d 399, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119 
(1985); and Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 246, but deny these damages to 
plaintiffs suing for fraud under a particular statutory section governing fraud in the purchase, sale, 
or exchange of property, see Channell v. Anthony, 58 Cal. App. 3d 290, 315, 129 Cal. Rptr. 704, 720 
(1976) (interpreting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (1971)); and Sierra National Bank v. Brown, 18 Cal. 
App. 3d 98, 103, 95 Cal. Rptr. 742, 745 (1971). 
16. Savage, 545 S.W.2d at 868 (citing decisions denying recovery without acknowledging the 
existence of any precedent supporting recovery). 
17. Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 39, 124 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1962). It appears 
that on some occasions courts' denial of recovery is shaped in part by counsel's failure to cite the 
case law that has allowed recovery. See In re Romero, 535 F.2d 618, 623 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting 
the litigant's contention that a bankruptcy court properly allowed consequential damages for in-
convenience and mental suffering; noting only that "[tjhis claim is presented without cogent 
authority"). 
18. E.g., Knox, 159 F. Supp. at 806 (stating that "(t]he Court further awards $2,500 for 
mental suffering"). 
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A few decisions, however, do offer a glimmer of policy analysis and 
thus provide an initial benchmark for evaluating the two approaches. 
The courts' articulated rationale for denying recovery of emotional dis-
tress damages rests on a conception of fraud as a purely commercial 
tort. Sometimes this view is embraced simply in conclusory language: 
that damages for fraud are "pecuniary damage [s]" because "[t]he aim 
of compensation in deceit cases is to put the plaintiff in the position he 
would have been had he not been defrauded."19 The Iowa Supreme 
Court recently denied emotional distress damages in a fraud case be-
cause those damages "are not ordinarily contemplated in a business 
transaction."20 The case noted that, according to a leading commenta-
tor, " 'deceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort.'" For these reasons 
the court found that " 'though strong men may cry at the loss of money, 
separate recovery for mental anguish is usually denied in deceit 
cases.' "21 In short, the court concluded that an action for fraud protects 
exclusively monetary interests—not feelings. 
Courts that have endorsed recovery for emotional distress, on the 
other hand, have emphasized that fraud is a tort cause of action, even 
though the case may have arisen out of a contractual dispute.22 One of 
these courts stated that an injured party "is entitled to recover in a tort 
action those damages which result directly, naturally and proximately 
from fraud."23 In addition, these courts have stressed that the culpabil-
ity of a fraud defendant, who has intentionally or recklessly deceived 
another, justifies an expansive measure of damages.24 This emphasis on 
moral culpability is more characteristic of tort than contract law. Thus, 
courts awarding emotional distress damages for fraud view fraud in a 
broader framework of intentional tort theory in which emotional dis-
tress damages typically are awarded.26 Under this view, the action for 
fraud protects both pecuniary and dignitary interests. 
19. Crockett, 51 Haw. at 52, 451 P.2d at 820 (emphasis in original). 
20. Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382. 
21. Id. (quoting D. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 9.2, at 602). 
22. See, e.g., John, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 406-07, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (stressing the tort 
theory of fraud in addition to a request for rescission of contract). 
23. Kneip, 734 S.W.2d at 136. 
24. See, e.g., Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 755, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 246 (emotional distress 
damages held appropriate because the defendant's conduct "clearly contained elements of inten-
tional malfeasance and bad faith"); Baker v. American States Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1981). Thus, courts that would award emotional distress damages if the plaintiff proved 
fraud would deny them if the plaintiff proved only negligent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Crowley 
v. Global Realty, Inc., 124 N.H. 814, 818-19, 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (1984); Charlie Stuart Oldsmo-
bile, Inc. v. Smith, 171 Ind. App. 315, 325-30, 357 N.E.2d 247, 255 (1976). 
25. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d at 1349 (quoting Charlie Stuart Oldsmo-
bile, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 315, 357 N.E.2d 247); Kneip, 734 S.W.2d at 136. 
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B. Four Qualified Approaches 
Most courts that directly have addressed the issue of emotional 
distress damages in fraud actions have taken a firm position awarding 
or denying such damages. A few opinions, however, have eschewed an 
absolute statement permitting or rejecting emotional distress damages 
in all fraud cases and have adopted a qualified position that allows such 
damages in some cases. These opinions have suggested four possible po-
sitions limiting the award of damages for emotional distress: (1) a re-
quirement that the emotional distress be particularly severe; (2) a 
demand that the plaintiffs pecuniary loss be substantial; (3) a distinc-
tion between business frauds and other frauds; and (4) an inclusion of 
emotional distress damages as part of a punitive damage award. Exami-
nation of these four approaches will lay a framework for appropriately 
resolving the issue as a matter of tort policy. 
1. Magnitude of Emotional Distress 
The emotional distress suffered by fraud victims ranges from petty 
annoyance or frustration to severely debilitating humiliation or depres-
sion.26 All courts probably would agree that plaintiffs seeking recovery 
for these feelings must prove their distress, rather than leaving the is-
sue to the mere conjecture of the jury.27 Most decisions awarding emo-
tional distress damages for fraud, however, have not required plaintiffs 
to prove any particular quantum of distress. In practice, the distress 
suffered by plaintiffs in most of these cases has been substantial enough 
to support a significant recovery.28 The absence of any formal require-
ment that the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress suggests that 
plaintiffs suffering even lesser varieties of distress could recover some 
damages for their suffering. 
26. The general concept of mental distress is very broad. It can encompass "nervousness, 
grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as physical pain." Crisci v. Security 
Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967). 
27. Haggerty v. March, 480 So. 2d 1064, 1068 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "[d]amages 
like any other fact should be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and to constitute a pre-
ponderance, such evidence must show the loss is more probable than not"). This court noted that 
"[t]he plaintiff made no effort to prove mental anguish or any other specific loss." Id. at 1067; see 
also Rosener, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 755, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 246 (noting that the plaintiffs evidence of 
mental suffering was "considerable, and convincing"). 
28. See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1157 
& n.l (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding one million dollar verdict apparently attributable to emotional 
distress), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983); Lewis v. Upton, 151 Cal. App. 3d 232, 237, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 494, 497 (1984) (holding that a jury could award a total of $13,000 in compensatory damages 
to a plaintiff who proved only $11,119.20 in pecuniary losses because the plaintiff suffered great 
emotional distress); Trimble v. City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 730 (Colo. 1985) (upholding $35,000 
verdict); Kneip, 734 S.W.2d at 134 (valuing emotional distress at $40,000 for each of two plaintiffs 
and $30,000 for a third plaintiff). 
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At least two jurisdictions, on the other hand, explicitly have limited 
recovery in fraud cases to serious emotional distress.29 These courts de-
fined compensable mental anguish as a relatively high degree of mental 
pain that "is more than mere disappointment, anger, restraint or em-
barrassment, although it may include all of these. It includes a mental 
sensation of pain resulting from such painful emotion as grief, severe 
disappointment, indignation, wounded pri$e, shame, despair and/or 
public humiliation/'30 One trial court applying this rule instructed ju-
rors that their consideration of "mental anguish" should not "include 
any amount for mere worry, anxiety, vexation or anger."31 
When the record in these cases has reflected "no serious emotional 
distress or anxiety," the courts have overturned verdicts awarding emo-
tional distress damages to defrauded plaintiffs.32 Under this standard, a 
plaintiff's testimony "that he was 'embarrassed/ 'mad,' and that he 'felt 
like scum'" was insufficient to support recovery.33 The court opined 
that this testimony did "not depict the equivalent of a mental sensation 
of pain or distress."34 Thus, a requirement of severe mental anguish sig-
29. McGregor v. Mommer, 714 P.2d 536, 545 (Mont. 1986); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 
S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
30. Roberts, 694 S.W.2d at 136 (quoting Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 
582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (finding emotional distress compensable in an action for invasion of 
privacy)). In Trevino, the court denied emotional distress damages to a plaintiff who introduced a 
third person's testimony that the plaintiff was "very upset" when the telephone company entered 
his store and took his telephones. The Trevino court contrasted the plaintiff's evidence with the 
evidence in another invasion of privacy case that properly awarded emotional distress damages. In 
the comparison case the plaintiffs had "testified at length as to their feelings of humiliation, stom-
ach aches, loss of sleep, nervousness and embarrassment," all of which made one plaintiff feel 
" 'like the size of a red ant,'" and troubled the plaintiffs wife to the point that she "could not 
sleep at night." Trevino, 582 S.W.2d at 584. Presumably the Roberts case would have allowed 
emotional distress damages in fraud cases with this type of evidence. 
31. Roberts, 694 S.W.2d at 133 (recounting the trial court's instruction to the jury). 
32. McGregor, 714 P.2d at 545. This court overturned emotional distress damages in a case 
raising both fraud and contract claims by invoking standards from a false imprisonment case that 
limited such damages to tortious conduct which " 'results in a substantial invasion of a legally 
protected interest and causes a significant impact upon the person of plaintiff/ " Id. (quoting 
Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 211 Mont. 465, 473, 686 P.2d 209, 213 (1984) (emphasis in 
original)). In McGregor the court deemed the plaintiffs testimony that his financial problems 
caused by the fraud "bothered him a lot" and " 'at times it would show up at home1 " insufficient 
to support recovery. Id. 
In part, the McGregor court was worried that the trial court's instruction would have permit-
ted the plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages "even if [he] recovered only on [his] con-
tract claim." Id. at 544. The McGregor court's limit appears equally applicable, however, to the 
plaintiffs claims of fraud, because the court drew these standards from the tort context of false 
imprisonment. For a later case applying the McGregor court's "significant impact" requirement to 
a tort claim of bad faith, see Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 635 (Mont. 1987) (require-
ment applied over the objections of a dissenting judge). 
33. Roberts, 694 S.W.2d at 136. 
34. Id. Any such standard is inherently imprecise in its application. Thus, a plaintiff appar-
ently cannot recover if he "feels like scum," id., but can recover if he feels " 'like the size of a red 
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nificantly limits a fraud plaintiffs opportunity to recover for emotional 
distress. 
2. Severity of Financial Injury 
Some California precedent has developed a second theory to limit 
emotional distress damages in fraud cases. Rather than requiring a 
threshold degree of emotional distress, this approach focuses on the ex-
tent of the pecuniary damage that the plaintiff has suffered.35 Under 
this rule a plaintiff can recover emotional distress damages in fraud 
cases only if the pecuniary harm suffered is substantial.36 
This standard originated in tort cases that involved bad faith con-
duct other than fraud.37 Courts in those cases envisioned the standard 
as a protection against false or trivial claims. Thus, one court explained 
that when the plaintiff's claim "is actionable and has resulted in sub-
stantial damages apart from those due to mental distress, the danger of 
fictitious claims is reduced."38 This court was not "concerned with mere 
ant,'" at least if he testifies to symptoms such as loss of sleep and stomach aches, see supra note 
30. The difficulty of applying this approach is indicated by the jury's reaction to the plaintiffs 
testimony in Roberts, In that fraud case the jury agreed to assign a value of $10,000 to mental 
distress, but the court regarded the mental distress as too insubstantial to support any recovery. 
Roberts, 694 S.W.2d at 136. Similarly, in McGregor a jury awarded $5,000 for mental anguish, but 
the court regarded the mental anguish as too insubstantial to support any recovery under a re-
quirement of "significant" impact on the plaintiff. McGregor, 714 P.2d at 544-55. 
35. See Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (trial court instructed 
jury using Book of Approved Jury Instructions, No. 12.85, quoted infra note 36), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 728 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1984). Dictum in Montana precedent might 
support a similar approach. See McGregor, 714 P.2d at 545; see also supra note 32. Although the 
McGregor court's opinion focused on the plaintiffs failure to establish a "significant" impact, it is 
possible that in other cases the court might invoke the second branch of this requirement and 
require a "substantial" invasion, 
36. A standard California jury instruction generalizes this rule in a manner that includes 
fraud cases and extends to other cases of financial injury as well: 
Emotional Distress Resulting From Financial Injury 
A plaintiff who has suffered a substantial financial injury which was [proximately] [le-
gally] caused by a defendant's intentional or reckless wrongful conduct, is entitled to recover 
damages from that defendant for any mental or emotional distress [proximately] [legally] 
resulting from such financial injury. 
2 COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPER. CT. OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALI-
FORNIA, JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 12.85 (C. Loring 7th 
ed. 1986) [hereinafter BAJI]. 
37. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 
(1967) (en banc) (suit against insurer for bad faith refusal to settle suit within policy limits); 
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 937, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 483-84 (1975) 
(suit by buyers of real estate against title insurance company for failing to discover, disclose, or 
eliminate easement). The Jarchow court purported to apply this standard to cases of mere negli-
gence, although Jarchow also involved claims of bad faith. Jarchow has been criticized for purport-
ing to expand the standard's coverage to merely negligent infliction of emotional distress without 
regard to bad faith. See Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 762, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (1977). 
38. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. 
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bad manners or trivialities but tortious conduct resulting in substantial 
invasions of clearly protected interests."39 California subsequently em-
bodied this standard in jury instructions for all types of tortious inflic-
tion of pecuniary injury40 and applied these instructions to fraud 
cases.41 In fraud, as in other contexts, the requirement of substantial 
pecuniary injury permits plaintiffs to recover emotional distress dam-
ages in many cases, but restricts recovery when the facts of a case sug-
gest any danger of abusive litigation. 
3. Distinction Between Business Fraud and Nonbusiness Fraud 
In Moore v. Slonim42 a federal district court dismissed a claim of 
emotional distress for fraud with language that appears to distinguish 
between business frauds and other frauds. The court asserted that "it is 
black letter law that damages for mental distress are not ordinarily 
available in a cause of action for business fraud."43 Two other opinions 
have quoted Slonim's language with approval.44 These cases suggest 
that some courts assume that emotional distress damages are appropri-
ate in cases of personal or nonbusiness fraud, but inappropriate in cases 
of business fraud. 
Many courts have allowed emotional distress damages in personal 
rather than purely commercial contexts. Thus courts have granted emo-
tional distress damages against a funeral director who defrauded be-
reaved relatives into foregoing the opportunity to see the body,45 
against an adoption agency that lied to an adopting couple about a 
troubled child's background,46 against an insurance salesman who 
deceived his customers,47 and against a man who fraudulently induced a 
39. Id. (footnote omitted). 
40. BAJI, supra note 36, No. 12.85. 
41. Walker, 515 F. Supp. at 619 (trial court instructed jury in fraud case using BAJI, supra 
note 36, No. 12.85). 
42. 426 F. Supp. 524 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
43. Id. at 527 (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 141f, at 469 (1943)). 
44. Cable v. Hechler, 421 F. Supp. 129, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 685 F.2d 423 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987). 
45. RidoutVBrown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway, 397 So. 2d 125 (Ala. 1981). 
46. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (1986). The 
agency told the couple that the infant was 4t 'a nice big, healthy, baby boy'" to whom an eighteen 
year old unwed mother had given birth at the local hospital. Id. at 70, 491 N.E.2d at 1103. The 
agency further explained that the young unwed mother was trying to work and that her parents 
were cruel to the child. In fact, the infant's mother was a thirty-one year old mental patient at 
Massillon State Hospital with physical as well as psychological problems and mental deficiencies. 
The child inherited from his mother a debilitating disease that destroyed his central nervous 
system. 
47. Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Haw.), aff'd, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert, 
denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962). 
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woman to enter into a void marriage.48 Courts also have awarded emo-
tional distress damages to home buyers suing deceptive real estate sell-
ers49 and home owners suing deceptive contractors;60 perhaps these 
suits also contain a special personal element, even though they certainly 
are economic transactions. Correspondingly, some courts have denied 
emotional distress damages in contexts that seem more clearly business 
related. For example, courts have denied recovery for emotional distress 
to a service station lessee who sued the lessor for misrepresentations 
that induced the lessee to enter a franchise agreement61 and to an au-
thor who was defrauded into entering a publishing contract.62 
Although these cases could support a generalized distinction be-
tween business frauds and personal frauds, this distinction does not 
serve as a very reliable guide to all judicial opinions. Other courts have 
denied recovery in contexts that seem distinctly personal. For example, 
one court refused to recompense the emotional suffering of a man who 
claimed that his paramour defrauded him in order to obtain money "by 
promising to marry him when in fact she had no intention of doing 
so."63 Many years ago a California court refused to grant emotional dis-
tress damages to a woman who had sold her property to a conniving 
developer only because the developer falsely claimed to share her dis-
tinctive religious beliefs about communicating with the spirits of the 
dead and promised to devote the property to the establishment of a 
home for welcoming people of this faith.64 Other courts have granted 
recovery for emotional distress damages in cases that seem distinctly 
commercial. These cases include a fast food restaurant franchisee's re-
48. Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 318 So. 2d 289 (1975). 
49. E.g., Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1982). 
50. E.g., Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980), 
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981). 
51. Carrigg v. Blue, 283 S.C. 494, 323 S.E.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984). Similarly, Cornell denied 
mental distress damages to a couple allegedly defrauded into purchasing a motel based on mislead-
ing concealment of facts regarding the profitability of the motel complex. The court commented 
that "[djamages for mental distress are not ordinarily contemplated in a business transaction." 
Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382. 
52. Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp., 187 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court stated 
that "damages are not recoverable in this type of action for loss of profits, physical pain and 
mental anguish or punitive damages." Id. at 323 (citing Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American 
President Lines, Ltd., 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
53. Harsche v. Czys, 157 Neb. 699, 700, 61 N.W.2d 265, 267 (1953). In Harsche the court 
intimated that it would have allowed recovery if the plaintiff had claimed breach of a promise to 
marry. The court, however, would not permit recovery on a fraud claim. Id. at 710-11, 61 N.W.2d 
at 272. The case thus reaches an opposite conclusion on facts notably similar to Holcombe. See 
supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
54. Newman v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22, 18 P. 791 (1888). The court permitted rescission of the 
contract based on fraud, but refused to grant damages for " 'anxiety, worry, and harassment/ " Id. 
at 27, 18 P. at 793. 
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covery of emotional distress damages from a franchisor who had mis-
represented material facts concerning the desirability of the franchise 
arrangement,65 a client's recovery from his real estate agent for fraud in 
the purchase of commercial properties,66 and a travel agency's recovery 
from an employee who had embezzled funds.67 Thus, the distinction be-
tween business fraud and nonbusiness fraud is not a reliable basis for 
reconciling the conflicting case law in this area.58 
4. Emotional Distress as a Component of Punitive Damage Awards 
Many states permit jurors to award punitive or exemplary damages 
in fraud cases.59 Jurors sometimes may include compensation for emo-
tional distress as part of these punitive damage awards. In some juris-
dictions, jurors in any fraud case may award emotional distress 
damages under the guise of punitive damages.60 In other jurisdictions, 
jurors may do so only if the fraud meets the additional, vague criteria 
necessary to support an award of punitive damages, such as oppression 
or aggravation.61 
In a few states courts explicitly allow damages for emotional dis-
tress as part of exemplary or punitive damages. Michigan courts, for 
example, have explained that their exemplary damages are intended as 
a form of extra compensation in cases marked by recklessness, bad 
55. Walker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 728 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1984). 
56. Jahn v. Brickey, 168 Cal. App. 3d 399, 214 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1985). 
57. Clare v. State, 456 So. 2d 355 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (criminal case upholding an order of 
restitution by relying on the damage measure that would be applied in a civil action), aff'd, 456 So. 
2d 357 (Ala. 1984). 
58. This Article later considers whether the distinction between business and nonbusiness 
fraud offers a sensible approach that, as a matter of policy, ought to guide the courts in deciding 
damage issues in fraud cases. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text. 
59. See, e.g., Moore Ford Co. v. Smith, 270 Ark. 340, 604 S.W.2d 943 (1980); Kleinfelter v. 
Northwest Builders & Developers, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 561, 261 S.E.2d 498 (1980); Barnes v. McKin-
ney, 589 P.2d 698 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978); Green v. Uncle Don's Mobile City, 279 Or. 425, 568 P.2d 
1375 (1977); Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 297 N.W.2d 495 (1980). Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
and Washington courts do not award punitive damages. See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.07-.12 (1985). 
60. See, e.g., Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288 n.13 (D.C. 1975); Newton v. Standard Fire 
Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976) (explaining that "fraud is, itself, one of the 
elements of aggravation which will permit punitive damages to be awarded"). 
61. See, e.g., Randell v. Banzhoff, 375 So. 2d 445, 448 (Ala. 1979) (holding that fraud must be 
-gross"), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); Holcomb v. Hoffschneider, 297 N.W.2d 210, 215 (Iowa 
1980) (denying recovery for "ordinary" fraud); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 
223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961). The practical effect of such vague limits is unclear; most cases of inten-
tional fraud arguably establish the reckless indifference to the rights of others or implied malice to 
which some of the restrictive cases refer. Cf. Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 1042, 479 
S.W.2d 518, 522 (1972) (finding that "malice" to support punitive damages does not require per-
sonal hatred; it includes intentional wrongdoing without just cause or excuse). 
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faith, or other oppressive conduct.62 Thus, these damages are not 
merely punitive in nature. Rather, they provide "compensatory dam-
ages for embarrassment and injured feelings" in cases of egregious mis-
conduct.63 These damages are available in commercial fraud cases when 
the plaintiff establishes fraudulent conduct independent from a breach 
of contract claim.64 Similarly, before recent statutory reforms66 a Geor-
gia statute permitted jurors to assess an extra amount of damages in 
actions marked by aggravating circumstances in order "to deter the 
wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the 
wounded feelings of the plaintiff."66 Several cases upheld the assess-
ment of these damages in fraud cases.67 
Even in the majority of jurisdictions which insist that punitive 
damages are not compensatory,68 jurors may inflate punitive damage 
awards to compensate plaintiffs for frustration or emotional suffering. 
Courts routinely instruct jurors to take into account "all the circum-
stances"69 in assessing punitive damages. Courts sometimes specifically 
direct the jury to consider "the extent of harm inflicted."70 These in-
62. Willett v. Ford Motor Co., 400 Mich. 65, 71, 253 N.W.2d 111, 113 (1977). 
63. Id.\ see also Loeblich v. Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95, 103 (La. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that 
"exemplary" damages which redress mental anguish are compensatory rather than punitive in na-
ture); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 464 (1876) (stating that damages for willful injury may in-
clude compensation for wounded feelings, though these damages are awarded under the name of 
punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873) (allowing exem-
plary damages to compensate wounded feelings). On the confused history and semantics of puni-
tive or exemplary damages in Michigan, see Wade, The Michigan Law of Punitive Damages, in 
MICHIGAN LAW OF DAMAGES 27-1 to -27 (1978). 
64. Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 420-21, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 
(1980); Gilroy v. Conway, 151 Mich. App. 628, 636-37, 391 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1986); Oppenhuizen v. 
Wennersten, 2 Mich. App. 288, 299-300, 139 N.W.2d 765, 771 (1966) (finding fraud in selling a car 
with a forged title; exemplary damages awarded for plaintiffs embarrassment in being questioned 
over alleged purchase of stolen vehicle). 
65. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(c) (Supp. 1988) (allowing punitive damages not as com-
pensation, but only to punish; effective for causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1987). 
66. Id. § 51-12-5. The statute purports to codify the common law. See id. § 51-12-5 editorial 
note. 
67. See Kelly v. Georgia Casualty & Sur. Co., 105 Ga. App. 104, 107, 123 S.E.2d 711, 713 
(1961); King v. Towns, 102 Ga. App. 895, 902-03, 118 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1960). 
68. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986) (holding that punitive 
damages are intended for punishment and deterrence, not as a means of recovering extra dam-
ages); Moore v. State Bank, 240 Kan. 382, 729 P.2d 1205 (1986) (holding that punitive damages are 
not designed for compensation), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987); Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986) (holding that the purpose of punitive damages is 
punishment rather than compensation). 
69. E.g., Rinaldi v. Aaron, 314 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1975); Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 235 Kan. 
175, 192, 679 P.2d 720, 734 (1984); Farrell v. Kramer, 159 Me. 387, 391, 193 A.2d 560, 562 (1963). 
70. Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 456, 375 A.2d 652, 655 (1977); see also Fort 
Worth Cab & Baggage Co. v. Salinas, 735 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in 
determining whether an award of exemplary damages is reasonable, a court examines many fac-
tors, including the "sensibilities" of the plaintiff); RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 908 comment e 
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structions invite jurors, if they are so inclined, to include an award for 
emotional distress. Moreover, appellate courts occasionally justify an 
award of punitive' damages by referring to, among other factors, the 
plaintiffs emotional distress.71 One court even suggested that a plaintiff 
added a punitive damage claim to a fraud case precisely because he rec-
ognized that the court was unlikely to include emotional distress as a 
regular element of compensatory damages.72 
Common sense, finally, suggests that jurors sometimes consider a 
plaintiffs emotional anguish in calculating a punitive damage award. 
Some evidence shows that jurors in civil cases attempt to award an 
overall amount of damages that they perceive as fair; if the jurors are 
precluded from compensating an element of damages in one part of 
their verdict, they will increase another award.73 Jurors in fraud cases, 
therefore, may assess generous punitive damages when they realize that 
the plaintiff otherwise will receive no compensation for frustration or 
mental distress. Indeed, one pair of commentators has noted that, in 
jurisdictions allowing only nominal damages for fraud, jurors may use 
(stating that the jury can consider the "extent of harm" to the plaintiff, including "the fact that 
the plaintiff has been put to trouble and expense in the protection of his interests"). 
71. See Wilkes v. Moses, 291 S.C. 504, 354 S.E.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1987) (affirming award of 
$700,000 actual and $300,000 punitive damages in accident case; the court focused on the extent of 
the plaintiffs injuries, including her severe pain and embarrassment); cf. McNeill v. Allen, 35 Colo. 
App. 317, 326, 534 P.2d 813, 819 (1975) (accepting for sake of argument counsel's position that 
evidence of emotional distress was relevant to the issue of exemplary damages). Conversely, courts 
have justified an award of emotional distress damages by observing that the standards for a puni-
tive damage award had been met. See Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 480, 485 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 154-55 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980). 
72. Sierra Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 18 Cal. App. 3d 98, 103, 95 Cal. Rptr. 742, 745-46 (1971) 
(attributing plaintiffs' interest in recovering punitive damages to their realization that they could 
not recover emotional distress damages as a regular component of compensatory damages). 
73. One commentator has pointed to a case retried several times in which three separate 
juries returned verdicts for the same total amount, even though only two of the three juries were 
permitted to award punitive damages. See Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957). In that case, the jurors who were forbidden to award punitive dam-
ages may have recharacterized the amount of punishment they wished to award as compensation 
for emotional distress. Similarly, jurors who are not invited to compensate emotional distress as a 
part of the regular compensatory damage award may satisfy their desire to reach a fair result by 
calculating this distress in an award of punitive damages. Cf. Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 
F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that a trial court's error in allowing the jury in a fraud case 
to award emotional distress damages as an aspect of compensatory damages reduced the risk that 
the jury had included compensation for emotional distress in its punitive damage verdict). 
From this perspective, it is ironic that punitive damages may have originated as an attempt by 
the courts to compensate wounded feelings when such compensation was not directly available. 
See Comment, supra, at 519; see also Hazelwood v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 114 111. App. 3d 703, 712, 
450 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (1983). Judicial focus on the punitive purpose of punitive damages may be 
counterbalanced by jurors who possibly still regard these damages as having, in part, a compensa-
tory function. 
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punitive damages to serve a compensatory function.74 Even in jurisdic-
tions allowing more substantial financial recovery for fraud the jury 
may be tempted to redress the plaintiffs mental anguish by increasing 
the punitive damage award-
Ill. ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SPECIAL RULE FOR FRAUD: THE 
RELATION OF FRAUD TO INDEPENDENT TORT ACTIONS FOR INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
During the past two decades most courts have recognized indepen-
dent tort actions for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Some courts have suggested that, although damages for emotional 
distress are not available in fraud suits, plaintiffs may recover those 
damages if they can establish separate claims for intentional or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.76 The issue, then, is whether these 
independent actions satisfy the claims of fraud victims for emotional 
distress damages. 
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The law always has permitted plaintiffs who suffer some physical 
injury to recover for emotional distress in addition to recovering for the 
physical injuries.76 The law also has permitted plaintiffs to recover emo-
tional distress damages for certain intentional invasions of their dig-
nity—notably assault, battery, or false imprisonment—even in the 
absence of any physical harm. Apart from physical injury or traditional 
dignitary torts, however, courts historically were reluctant to grant re-
covery for emotional distress damages. 
Over the past two decades, however, courts have recognized that 
traditional tort actions would not reach some forms of contemptible be-
havior that caused significant emotional distress. To redress these inju-
ries, courts created the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
74. See 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 59, § 19.17, at 54. The authors suggest that in 
these jurisdictions 
one cannot help but suspect another ratio decidendi, albeit not articulated. The plaintiff who 
is thus allowed to recover punitive damages, as is the case with some dignitary torts, is effec-
tively provided a form of rough compensation though in the guise of exemplary damages, for 
the harm he or she has suffered because of the tort but has been unable to quantify for the 
purposes of the customary compensatory damage award. 
Id. 
75. See infra notes 80-91 ahd accompanying text. 
76. Recovery of emotional distress damages in this circumstance is not limited to suits 
against intentional tortfeasors. Many negligence cases dealing with physical harm include a compo-
nent of emotional distress damages. See, e.g., Grubbs v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 536, 541, 542 
(N.D. Ind. 1984); Pretre v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 931, 934 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (stating "mental 
anguish attendant upon bodily injuries is a compensible [sic] injury"); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. 
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 362-63 (5th ed. 1984). 
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distress. Although this tort has gained widespread acceptance, the 
courts, fearing an inundation of lawsuits challenging mere bad manners, 
have attempted to restrict recovery to the most extreme kinds of anti-
social behavior. To this end, courts uniformly have insisted that plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
meet several restrictive criteria: (1) the defendant must have intended 
to upset the plaintiff or must have acted with reckless disregard of the 
consequences; (2) the conduct must have been "beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and . . . regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera-
ble in a civilized community''; and (3) the plaintiffs emotional distress 
must have been severe.77 To reflect the extreme nature of this action, 
some courts have termed it the tort of "outrage."78 
Plaintiffs in fraud actions frequently invoke this new tort theory as 
an alternative means of recovering damages for emotional distress.79 
Even when plaintiffs do not specifically plead intentional infliction of 
emotional distress as a separate theory of liability, some judges use the 
standards developed for that tort to evaluate the availability of emo-
tional distress damages based on the fraud claim. In most cases, fraud 
plaintiffs fail to meet one of the restrictive criteria for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 
In Ma v. Community Bank,*0 for example, a bank assured a cus-
tomer that if he lost his certificate of deposit the bank would issue a 
new one without charge. Later, when the certificate was stolen, the 
bank continually refused to reissue the certificate unless the plaintiff 
posted a substantial bond. The plaintiff sued for fraud, seeking both his 
pecuniary loss and damages for emotional distress. The trial court 
awarded pecuniary loss damages, but denied emotional distress dam-
ages. The Seventh Circuit, applying its view of Wisconsin law, affirmed 
the denial of these damages on the ground that the plaintiffs, seeking 
damages for emotional distress based on fraud, had failed to prove the 
following: (1) that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing emo-
tional distress to the plaintiff; (2) that the conduct was extreme and 
77. See Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984) (stating the second 
criterion quoted in the text); see also Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds, Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); 
LeCroy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Plocar v. Dunkin' 
Donuts of Am., Inc., 103 111. App. 3d 740, 431 N.E.2d 1175 (1981); Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
422 Mich. 594, 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46. 
78. See, e.g., Spencer v. King County, 39 Wash. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874 (1984), overruled on 
other grounds, Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017 (1986). 
79. E.g., Truesdell v. Proctor, 443 So. 2d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (alleging fraud and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Stewart v. Isbell, 155 Mich. App. 65, 399 N.W.2d 440 
(1986) (alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress). 
80. 686 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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outrageous; and (3) that the defendant's conduct caused an extreme 
and disabling emotional response by the plaintiff.81 In short, the court 
borrowed the standards for the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and used them to deny emotional distress damages in a 
fraud action.82 
The Seventh Circuit interpreted Illinois law in a similar fashion in 
Durant v. Surety Homes Corp.63 In that case a contractor defrauded a 
buyer into purchasing a home with a cracked foundation. The buyer 
brought suit for fraud; the trial court granted compensation for pecuni-
ary loss and awarded punitive damages, but denied damages for the 
plaintiffs emotional distress. In affirming the trial court's denial of the 
emotional distress damages, the Seventh Circuit invoked Illinois' lead-
ing case on the separate tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and stated that the defendant could be liable only for actions 
"calculated to cause 'severe emotional distress' to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities."84 Based on this standard the Durant court denied recov-
ery because the plaintiff had failed to establish the defendant's wrong-
ful intent.86 
Curiously, the Durant court construed the already narrow require-
ments for recovery in a particularly restrictive manner. The court of 
appeals ruled against the plaintiff because it agreed with the trial court 
that "simply no evidence of intention to cause such distress" existed.86 
Thus, the court seemed to require a specific intent to create distress. 
Controlling precedent, however, had established that a plaintiff could 
win an intentional infliction claim by establishing merely reckless con-
duct.87 That conduct was present in Durant; indeed, the court affirmed 
an award of punitive damages precisely because evidence existed to es-
tablish that the contractor "not only committed fraud, but did so de-
signedly or wantonly, with reckless disregard for the Durants' rights."88 
In another colorful case a court applied a similarly narrow reading 
81. Id. at 469. 
82. Alternatively, the court said that the plaintiff could recover emotional distress damages 
on a theory of bad faith breach of contract, but only if the plaintiff could prove " 'substantial 
damages aside and apart from the emotional distress itself and . . . damages occasioned by the 
simple breach of contract.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 696, 
271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (1978)). Because the plaintiff had not pleaded or proved these damages, this 
theory also was of no avail to the plaintiff. 
83. 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978). 
84. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 111. 2d 73, 86 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (1961); see also D.R.W. Corp. v. 
Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 (1974) (measuring the availability of emotional distress 
damages in a fraud case by the standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
85. Durant, 582 F.2d at 1085. 
86. Id. 
87. See Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 111. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976). 
88. Durant, 582 F.2d at 1087, 1088. 
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of the standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress in order 
to deny these damages to a disaffected disciple who sued the Maharishi 
Mahesh Yogi for fraud.89 The court rejected the separate emotional dis-
tress claim because most claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress are based on a specific, discrete incident.90 Although the plain-
tiff claimed that he had wasted eleven years of his life, including years 
of free labor, in the service of a phony, the court dismissed this loss as 
merely a "continuing injury." As in Durant, no prior case law compelled 
this restriction; indeed, another state had rejected proposals for a simi-
lar "sudden occurrence" requirement even in the context of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.91 
A few cases have permitted fraud plaintiffs to recover damages for 
mental anguish under the standards of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In a securities fraud case, Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,92 the court based liability on both theo-
ries, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the 
defendant brokerage company had actual knowledge that the plaintiff 
was an illiterate, insecure person with grave concern for protecting her 
financial security. Against this background the court affirmed the jury's 
finding that the defendant's plan—to pressure the plaintiffs gullible 
husband into investing the couple's hard-won earnings in a margin ac-
count, trading in his wife's account without her permission, and lying to 
his wife—was "outrageous."93 In another case a court concluded that a 
89. Doe v. Yogi, 652 F. Supp. 203 (D.D.C. 1986). The yogi allegedly represented that science 
had proved that transcendental meditation could reverse aging, result in enlightenment, and pro-
mote world peace. The yogi also promised to teach the plaintiff to fly, to levitate (an exercise that 
consisted of hopping around the floor in a lotus position), and "to manipulate the physical world 
and the laws of nature." Id. at 205. The plaintiff sought to recover for the costs of taking courses 
from the yogi, for his emotional distress in realizing that he had wasted eleven years of his life in 
the movement, and for his physical injuries suffered while trying to learn to "fly." Id. 
90. Id. at 209. The court did uphold a separate cause of action for fraud against a challenge 
that the yogi's promises were mere opinion. The court did not, however, indicate whether it would 
be willing to grant emotional distress damages under the fraud count. Thus, it is unclear whether 
the court anticipated allowing the plaintiff some emotional distress damages under the fraud 
count, or whether the court envisioned the fraud count as limited to a claim for: (1) the costs 
expended on the yogi's courses; and possibly (2) the physical injuries suffered while performing 
yoga exercises. 
91. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). The 
court in Ochoa permitted a mother to recover for the anguish she suffered while the penal facility 
holding her son continually declined to give him proper medical treatment. The court specifically 
rejected the defendant's argument that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress should 
be limited to those family members who are contemporaneous witnesses to a "sudden occurrence." 
92. 703 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). 
93. Id. at 1159. The wife was a Korean immigrant who could neither read nor write Korean 
or English. The husband had only a tenth grade education and worked as a manual laborer "al-
most every waking hour, including all major holidays." Id. at 1160. The couple had "adopted a 
spartan lifestyle, spending very little for anything other than basic necessities and doing nothing in 
1989] DIGNITARY TORTS 19 
realty company's misrepresentations that a house was free of termites 
and dry rot were outrageous enough to support the purchasers' action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.94 
These cases, however, remain the exception rather than the rule. 
Even strikingly antisocial conduct frequently fails to satisfy the "outra-
geousness" requirement of the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress tort. In a recent Florida case, for example, a supermarket 
repeatedly pressured an employee to sign confessions to theft, despite 
her tearful protests that she was innocent.96 The supermarket finally 
induced her to cooperate by assuring her that it was standard practice 
to require all employees to sign these confessions as part of a lie detec-
tor test, and that the employer would not fire her if she signed one.96 
When the employee finally succumbed to the coercion, the employer 
fired her. The court, nonetheless, rejected a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress on the basis that this case "[did] not meet the 
test of outrageousness."97 Nevertheless, the court upheld a claim for 
emotional distress damages as an aspect of the employee's fraud 
claim.98 
Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, therefore, do 
not obviate consideration of damages for emotional distress in fraud ac-
tions. In many fraud cases, plaintiffs will be unable to convince a court 
that their distress was severe, to convince a court that the defendant's 
actions were outrageous, or to convince some courts that a particularly 
narrow formulation of an intent requirement has been satisfied. Ironi-
cally, because fraud is common enough in today's society, courts may no 
longer consider it sufficiently extraordinary to satisfy the requirement 
the way of entertainment." Id. Both husband and wife recognized that the husband was extremely 
gullible and therefore took special steps to put the couple's assets into accounts in the wife's name 
alone. 
94. Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1982). Similarly, one 
might expect that a fraud by a funeral parlor director against the deceased's relatives would satisfy 
any court's sense of outrageousness. Thus, emotional distress damages have been granted against a 
mortician who falsely represented that the deceased's face had been "eaten up with maggots" in 
order to avoid the trouble of preparing the body for viewing by the deceased's family. Ridout's-
Brown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway, 397 So. 2d 125, 127 (Ala. 1981). In that case, the plaintiff had stated 
claims for both fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court endorsed a 
$220,000 verdict (almost all of which must have represented compensation for emotional distress) 
without specifying whether it was awarded on one or both theories of recovery. 
95. Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
96. Id. at 151. Indeed, the employer interpreted the lie detector's finding that her confession 
was a lie as an indication that she must have stolen more money than originally stated on the 
confession. The employer thus coerced the employee to sign confessions for ever-increasing 
amounts. Id. 
97. Id. at 153. 
98. Id. at 154-55. 
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of outrageousness." Thus, if courts wish to compensate defrauded 
plaintiffs for emotional distress, they should do so by reformulating 
their definition of compensatory damages for fraud, rather than by rele-
gating those plaintiffs to the restrictive theory of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.100 
The standards developed for the new tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, moreover, are inappropriate when applied to 
plaintiffs in fraud cases. Courts created the new tort theory to permit 
recovery in a narrow class of cases that failed to fit within any estab-
lished tort action.101 At the same time, the courts wanted to protect 
themselves from being overwhelmed with attempts to turn mere bad 
manners or petty incivilities into court cases.102 Hence, the courts re-
strictively defined the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
These concerns, however, do not apply to the fraud plaintiff. Fraud 
is a well-established tort, not a novel cause of action. The existence of 
this claim, moreover, demonstrates that society already considers fraud 
more than mere bad manners; it is seriously antisocial behavior that 
justifies the imposition of substantial compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and even criminal penalties.103 Finally, fraud cases are already 
in the courts, whether the plaintiff claims emotional distress damages 
or not. Indeed, the courts are open to fraud claims that assert any mea-
sure of pecuniary loss, however small.104 A few courts permit plaintiffs 
to bring fraud actions for nominal damages even without proof of spe-
cific financial loss.106 Thus, awarding emotional distress damages in 
99. Courts reserve the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress for occasional cases 
that strike them as unusually egregious. See, e.g., Oswalt v. County of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241, 
248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the tort is "sharply limited to cases involving particu-
larly egregious facts"). 
100. Food Fair, 382 So. 2d at 150. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
101. For example, a leading decision recognized a separate theory of recovery for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress when gangsters threatened a businessman with future injury. The 
court did so because it felt the action failed to fit within traditional tort requirements of assault, 
battery, or false imprisonment. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 
282 (1952). 
102. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46 comment d. 
103. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining purposeful de-
ception as theft). Federal statutes prohibiting mail and wire fraud authorize penalties of $1,000 
and prison terms of up to five years. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). 
104. Most courts require the plaintiff to establish some pecuniary damage or detriment as an 
element of a basic cause of action for fraud. See, e.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1028-29 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (stating that <4a sine qua non of any recovery for misrepresentation is a showing of 
pecuniary loss proximately caused by reliance on the misrepresentation;" nominal damages held 
not available), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977). The cases do not require, however, that the plain-
tiffs damages be major; the cases only require that the damages be measurable. For a case award-
ing only $5 in damages, see D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 222 N.W.2d 671 (1974). 
105. See Greater Coral Springs Realty, Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate, Inc., 412 So. 2d 940 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (awarding "nominal" damages of $1,000 in addition to punitive dam-
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fraud cases will not swamp the courts with additional lawsuits. 
In short, the policy concerns that justify restrictive requirements 
for the separate tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are 
inapplicable to causes of action for fraud. Courts should not view this 
new tort theory as excusing a careful consideration of the need to make 
emotional distress damages generally more available in fraud claims. 
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Many courts are expanding plaintiffs' opportunities for recovery 
based only on negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs who 
have suffered no physical injury, however, must hurdle a series of legal 
barriers. Most courts agree that the plaintiffs distress must be se-
vere.106 Many jurisdictions also require "physical consequences" or "ob-
jective symptomology" of the plaintiffs distress, such as weight loss or 
severe depression.107 If the plaintiff has suffered mental anguish from 
witnessing physical injuries negligently inflicted upon another person, 
courts typically require proof that the plaintiff was close to the acci-
dent, saw the accident directly, and was a close relative of the victim.108 
Some courts apply an even more restrictive rule that limits recovery to 
bystanders who were physically endangered by the defendant's con-
duct.109 By curtailing the number of plaintiffs who may recover for neg-
ages); Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Ban, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984). Several 
other jurisdictions award nominal damages when the plaintiff persuades the court that he has 
suffered some real damage, but fails to introduce sufficiently detailed evidence to allow the court to 
compute the value of the damages with a reasonable degree of accuracy. See, e.g., Long-Lewis 
Hardware Co. v. Lightsey, 392 So. 2d 545 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); In re Busse, 124 111. App. 3d 433, 
464 N.E.2d 651 (1984); Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d 1328 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). 
Although the awarding of nominal damages for fraud is still the minority rule, one commentator 
concludes from these cases that the law is in a state of development, "and the old rules can no 
longer be stated with assurance." R. DUNN, supra note 7, § 6.02, at 205. 
106. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541 n.l, 673 P.2d 822, 825 n.l (1983) 
(stating that emotional distress must have a "severity which no reasonable person could be ex-
pected to endure"); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 72, 451 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1983) (stating that 
distress must be so "severe and debilitating" that a reasonable person would be "unable to cope 
adequately"). 
107. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 
128 111. App. 3d 1029, 1043, 471 N.E.2d 530, 539-40 (1984), aff'd, 113 111. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 
(1986); Dailey v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970). But see St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. 
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987) (abandoning a requirement of physical injury or physical 
manifestation of emotional distress and noting "an established trend in American jurisprudence 
which recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish without imposing arbitrary re-
strictions on recovery in such actions"); cf. Alabama Power Co. v. Harmon, 483 So. 2d 386 (Ala. 
1986) (holding that emotional distress damages could be awarded in a breach of contract action 
without proof of physical symptoms). 
108. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). For examples 
of courts following Dillon's basic approach, see Eagle-Picher Indus, v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Ramirez, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822. 
109. Farmer's Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), aft'd, 691 P.2d 
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ligent infliction of emotional distress, all these restrictions protect 
defendants from oppressive liability and shield the courts from burden-
some litigation.110 
As victims of intentional misconduct, fraud plaintiffs are more 
likely to add claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress than 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. At least one court, how-
ever, has measured the availability of psychological damages in a fraud 
case by borrowing the standards for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. In Goldberg v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,111 a physician claimed that a 
drug company defrauded him by intentionally misrepresenting that its 
product, a dye used to X-ray spinal cords, had no adverse side effects. 
The drug company allegedly knew that some patients had suffered se-
vere adverse reactions to the dye. Doctor Goldberg sued the drug com-
pany for fraud after two of his patients, who had suffered severe 
physical injuries from the product, sued the doctor for malpractice. The 
doctor claimed that witnessing his patients' adverse reactions to the 
drug caused him such emotional distress that he discontinued adminis-
tering myelograms to other patients and suffered economic loss by fore-
going this aspect of his medical practice.112 The court denied damages 
for this loss, stating that even if the doctor's debilitating emotional dis-
tress was the cause of his decision to stop administering myelograms, he 
was not a family member of the injured patients and was not physically 
endangered by the wrongdoing.113 
In reaching this conclusion, the Goldberg court overlooked an es-
sential distinction between the case before it and more typical claims of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doctor Goldberg was not sim-
1138 (Colo. 1984) (en banc); Green v. Leibowitz, 118 A.D.2d 756, 757, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (1986); 
Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980). Al-
though a few courts have been attracted to a more liberal rule of pure foreseeability, compare 
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156,174, 472 P.2d 509, 520-21 (1970) with Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 
Cal. 3d 159, 190, 703 P.2d 1, 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 683 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting in part), most 
jurisdictions continue to restrain these negligence actions for emotional distress within the bounds 
of more restrictive criteria. 
110. Courts have been concerned about unfairly imposing "disproportionate" recovery on de-
fendants who were merely negligent. E.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 247, 513 A.2d 341, 351 
(1986). 
111. 792 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1986). 
112. Id. at 307-10. Although he originally claimed damages for the emotional distress, the 
doctor subsequently limited his request to compensation for the economic harm he suffered when 
his emotional distress caused him to forego treating other patients. Id. One can only speculate on 
the reasons for this retreat from the original claim. It seems unfairly cynical to posit that the 
doctor was admitting that he was not really upset by viewing his patients' suffering and was con-
cerned only about the money he would lose in future operations. It seems more likely that the 
doctor believed the court would be more receptive to a damage theory that, while linked to emo-
tional distress, stressed an actual pecuniary injury rather than emotional distress alone. 
113. Id. at 310. 
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plv one of a potentially unlimited number of witnesses to another's suf-
fering- Rather, he was the one person who had been defrauded into 
personally inflicting that injury on another. Thus, the doctor had the 
unusually close personal connection with the accident that courts ordi-
narily seek by requiring that the plaintiff be related to the victim or 
fear for his own physical safety. 
As with intentional infliction of emotional distress, the standards 
developed to restrict the tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress should not be applied to fraud actions. Fraud is a recognized tort, 
not a novel, expansive theory of recovery. Society already has judged 
fraud to be significant rather than petty antisocial conduct. Because 
fraud actions are limited to persons actually defrauded, these actions 
will not burden the courts with suits by hundreds of bystanders who 
claim that they were upset by witnessing injuries inflicted upon others. 
Finally, allowing emotional distress damages in fraud cases will not im-
pose an unfairly disproportionate burden on defendants. Justice favors 
a larger measure of recovery against intentional wrongdoers than 
against merely negligent ones. 
In sum, the availability of separate claims for intentional or negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cannot adequately compensate 
fraud victims for their mental anguish. Too often, plaintiffs in fraud 
cases will be unable to satisfy the exacting requirements of these sepa-
rate torts. The policy reasons supporting those restrictive standards, 
moreover, are inapplicable to fraud plaintiffs. Before deciding whether 
to award damages for emotional distress in fraud actions, the courts 
independently must examine the policies favoring and opposing those 
damages. 
IV. SUPPLYING THE MISSING POLICY ANALYSIS-. TOWARD A CONCEPTION 
OF FRAUD AS A DIGNITARY TORT 
A. Compensation for Emotional Distress in Fraud Cases 
Compensation for a wrongfully inflicted injury is a basic tort pol-
icy.114 Courts should deny damages for emotional distress in fraud 
cases, therefore, only if a persuasive policy reason for denial exists. 
Three possible interests bear upon the availability of these damages: (1) 
the needs of potential plaintiffs; (2) the concerns of potential defend-
ants; and (3) society's interest in an efficient court system. Balancing 
these interests suggests that, as a general rule, emotional distress dam-
ages should be awarded in fraud actions. 
114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 901 (stating the compensatory and deterrence 
goals of tort damages). 
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Fraud plaintiffs have a substantial interest in recovering damages 
for emotional distress. Defrauded plaintiffs are burdened by mental dis-
tress ranging from significant annoyance and frustration to severe de-
pression. The cases include plaintiffs to whom fraud has meant 
deterioration of marital harmony,115 or near paralysis in depression.116 
Indeed, in tort cases involving bad faith conduct "it is likely that the 
greatest portion of plaintiffs' injuries Would take the form of emotional 
distress (e.g., vexation, tension, frustration, and worry)," rather than 
just financial harm.117 Thus, if damages for emotional distress are not 
awarded, a defrauded plaintiff is denied full compensation. 
Even commentators who oppose the awarding of emotional distress 
damages for fraud acknowledge that fraud victims may suffer serious 
emotional distress. Professor Dan Dobbs, for example, concedes that 
emotional distress "result[s] naturally enough from many frauds" and 
that "strong men may cry at the loss of money."118 Another pair of au-
thors agree that "one might suffer a great deal of anguish and humilia-
tion as a result of being led down the primrose path through 
misrepresentation."119 
A substantial body of sociological literature, moreover, confirms 
that victims of wrongdoing suffer severe mental anguish. In one survey, 
victims of property crimes rated their emotional suffering as worse than 
their financial loss.120 These studies have focused on violent crimes, 
such as rape or assault, and on theft of tangible property. Their find-
ings, however, may be relevant to the victims of white collar wrongs 
such as fraud.121 Some research stresses "the extent and depth of feel-
ings displayed [by victims] even after what appear objectively to be rel-
atively minor crimes."122 Other research suggests that the intentional 
nature of a crime contributes to the severe emotional distress suffered 
by victims; victims react to the intentional invasion of their dignity 
115. Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154, 166-67, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95, 101 (1982) (tell-
ing the plaintiffs story of marital arguments, destruction of normal sex life, and husband's turn to 
alcohol). 
116. Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 
1981), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). 
117. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 950, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 493 
(1975). 
118. D. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 602. 
119. 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 59, § 19.17, at 48. 
120. Maguire, Victims' Needs and Victim Services: Indications from Research, 10 VIC-
TIMOLOGY 539, 549 (1985). 
121. Some authors have encouraged victimology studies of white collar crime and illegal busi-
ness practices. See Viano, Theoretical Issues and Practical Concerns for Future Research in Vic-
timology, 10 VICTIMOLOGY 736, 740 (1985). To date, however, apparently no specific studies of the 
victims of such violations have been done. 
122. Maguire, supra note 120, at 550. 
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with feelings of self-doubt, self-blame, humiliation, and distrust of 
others.123 Intentional fraud may elicit similar feelings. 
In certain respects the mental anguish experienced by fraud vic-
tims may be more intense than that suffered by some victims of other 
types of wrongdoing. Victims of armed robbery perhaps may fault 
themselves for their misfortune;124 but defrauded investors or consum-
ers may be even more likely to berate themselves for falling prey to a 
deceitful scam. Thus, because fraud results from a consensual transac-
tion, the victim's feelings of self-blame and self-doubt may be 
heightened. 
Finally, in creating the torts of intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, courts have recognized that "[e]motional injury 
. is deserving of redress" because it "can be as severe and debilitat-
ing as physical harm."125 That observation applies equally to plaintiffs 
in fraud actions. Just as courts have weighted heavily the interests of 
distressed plaintiffs in developing new torts to compensate emotional 
harm, courts also should acknowledge the compelling interests of fraud 
plaintiffs in redressing their emotional injury. 
The concerns of defendants in fraud cases do not override the 
plaintiffs' need for compensation. To win a fraud case, the plaintiff 
must establish that the defendant intentionally deceived the plaintiff.126 
123. See Janoff-Bulman, Criminal vs. Non-Criminal Victimization: Victims' Reactions, 10 
VICTIMOLOGY 498 (1985). 
124. Id. at 505 (discussing self-blame of crime victims). 
125. Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 135, 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1983); see 
also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987) (stating that "[i]t is well 
recognized that certain psychological injuries can be just as severe and debilitating as physical 
injuries"). 
126. See, e.g., KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 778 F.2d 1571, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Paskas v. Illini Fed. Saw & Loan Ass'n, 109 111. App. 3d 24, 32, 440 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1982); Kawin 
v. Chrysler Corp., 636 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. 1982); Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 
N.C. 461, 468, 343 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1986); McGovern v. Crossley, 477 A.2d 101, 103 (R.I. 1984); cf. 
Nielsen v. Adams, 223 Neb. 262, 388 N.W.2d 840 (1986) (excusing the plaintiff from showing a 
specific intent to defraud, but requiring the plaintiff to establish that the defendant knew that the 
statements were false). Many courts permit reckless disregard for the truth to satisfy the scienter 
requirement of an action for deceit, but only because a knowingly ignorant individual who pur-
ports to speak from careful knowledge acts with the moral equivalent of intentional falsehood. See, 
e.g., Martins Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333, 439 A.2d 534, 537 (1982); Florenzano v. 
Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 1986); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (H.L. 1889) (Her-
schell, L.J.). 
A few courts speak loosely of negligent misrepresentation as fraud or "constructive" fraud. 
This Article, however, considers only the traditional action for deceit, which requires proof of in-
tentional misrepresentation. All courts awarding damages for emotional distress in fraud cases 
have limited those damages to cases of intentional fraud. See, e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 
207, 215, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (1980) (recognizing that "mental distress damages may be recov 
ered in an action for deceit," but insisting that the "allegations of intentional wrongdoing must b 
specific and will be closely scrutinized"); Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, 171 Ind. Apj 
315, 325, 357 N.E.2d 247, 252 (1976) (denying emotional distress damages when the defendant' 
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An intentional swindler is in a poor position to argue that it is unfair to 
compensate fully the plaintiffs loss;127 thus, tort law's twin goals of de-
terrence and compensation combine to support the award of emotional 
distress damages against perpetrators of intentional fraud.128 Moreover, 
defendants in fraud cases cannot claim that damages for emotional dis-
tress are either unforeseeable or unduly burdensome. In most cases the 
defrauded plaintiffs distress is easily foreseen. In those few cases in 
which the trivial nature of a fraud renders the plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress unexpected, the ordinary tort requirements of foreseeability and 
proximate cause will insulate the defendant from liability. Recovery for 
emotional distress in fraud actions, furthermore, will be limited to the 
plaintiffs who relied on the defendant's representations. Thus, a de-
fendant need not worry about liability to an unknown and potentially 
limitless number of bystanders.129 For all these reasons, the defendant's 
interests in a fraud case do not justify special theories of damages, du-
conduct was merely negligent); Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 124 N.H. 814, 818, 474 A.2d 1056, 
1058 (1984) (distinguishing theories of intentional tort from theories of mere negligent 
misrepresentation). 
127. For example, a substantial body of case law applies a broader view of proximate cause to 
cases involving intentional tortfeasors than to cases involving merely negligent tortfeasors. See 
Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Rem-
edy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REV. 469, 501-06 (1988). 
128. Several states draw a similar distinction in awarding emotional distress damages to 
plaintiffs who were upset by tortious interference with their personal property. Compensation is 
denied if the defendant has acted only with negligence, but can be granted if the defendant acted 
intentionally or with malice. See, e.g., Walker v. Ingram, 251 Ala. 395, 37 So. 2d 685 (1948) (award-
ing mental distress damages to tenant against landlord for landlord's intentional trespass to prop-
erty under hostile circumstances); Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 147 Colo. 591, 597-98, 364 P.2d 730, 
733 (1961) (generalizing that plaintiffs can recover emotional distress damages for injury to prop-
erty if "the act occasioning the injury to property was inspired by fraud, malice, or like motives" 
and stating that "proof of a willful or wanton tort as distinguished from a mere negligent injury, 
seems to be the most common distinction in the authorities"); Thibodeaux v. Western World Ins. 
Co., 391 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (concerning intentional trespass and deliberate cutting of 
trees); Fredeen v. Stride, 269 Or. 369, 372-73, 525 P.2d 166, 168 (1974) (stating that emotional 
distress damages generally are denied in conversion cases, but are awarded if the defendant's con-
duct was "aggravated" and if "mental suffering is the direct and natural result of the conversion"). 
See generally Annotation, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to or 
Interference with Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1953). In states following this approach, 
an award of emotional distress damages for fraud could be supported as an application of rules 
generally governing invasions of property interests. Occasional opinions have granted emotional 
distress damages for even negligent injury to property. See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Sta-
tion, 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981). 
129. Some fraudulent statements, such as fraudulent statements in a securities prospectus or 
an accounting statement, may create potential liability to numerous plaintiffs. The common-law 
courts already have determined, however, that in cases of deliberate fraud, as opposed to negligent 
misrepresentation, the defendant's interest in avoiding a large measure of liability does not out-
weigh the large plaintiff group's interest in receiving compensation. See Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (holding that a privity 
limit applies to an action for negligent misrepresentation, but not to an action for fraud). 
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ties, or causation to curtail liability for emotional distress. 
Finally, society's interest in efficient judicial administration does 
not counsel denying damages for emotional distress.130 Awarding these 
damages will not open the judicial floodgates to an entirely new class of 
claims; plaintiffs already bring fraud suits focusing on the pecuniary 
harm that they have suffered.131 Nor would expanding the range of 
damages for fraud pose a serious risk of manufactured claims: in nu-
merous other areas of tort law, courts already trust jurors to evaluate 
claims of emotional distress objectively.132 Indeed, courts recognizing 
the new torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress have stressed their confidence in lay jurors' ability to evaluate the 
genuineness of such claims.133 Finally, it is unlikely that allowing dam-
ages for emotional distress in fraud cases will burden the courts with 
trivial lawsuits. Claims of trivial distress will receive trivial damage 
awards. Few plaintiffs will wish to pay the legal bills for initiating such 
claims, and attorneys will not be willing to undertake these claims for a 
contingency fee. 
In any event, if courts are concerned about the impact that claims 
for emotional distress in fraud cases might have on judicial administra-
tion, they should tailor the rules of proof to reduce that impact, rather 
than denying the damages altogether. A requirement of serious distress 
or substantial pecuniary injury, for example, might winnow out false 
130. This interest, in any event, should not be given undue weight in a policy calculus: 
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a "flood 
of litigation"; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice 
to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the courts too much work to do. 
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970) (quoting Prosser, Intentional 
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939)). 
131. Only two potential ways exist through which the recognition of these damages might 
increase the amount of litigation. First, recognition theoretically might affect cases in which the 
amount of pecuniary damages did not justify the expenses of litigation (even when augmented by 
the possibility of a punitive damage award), but in which plaintiffs and their attorneys concluded 
that an extra measure of damages for emotional distress would make the lawsuit cost-effective. It 
seems unlikely, however, that many cases without a substantial financial injury or a prospect of 
substantial punitive damages would support a significant award for emotional distress. Second, 
recognition of emotional distress damages might have some effect if jurisdictions that do not cur-
rently permit fraud actions for purely nominal damages chose to permit these plaintiffs to sue 
solely for emotional distress, even absent any proof of other damage. Courts concerned about this 
second prospect, however, can retain their insistence that plaintiffs establish some real pecuniary 
loss as a predicate to claiming damages for emotional distress. 
132. For example, jurors pleasure emotional distress in cases of assault, offensive battery, or 
false imprisonment, in which the emotional distress damages are for fright, embarrassment, or loss 
of dignity, rather than for physical pain and suffering. Many cases of physical injury also include 
an award for the plaintiffs pain and suffering. 
133. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); 
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 
4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 134-35, 447 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1983). 
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claims and discourage plaintiffs from seeking recovery for trivial inju-
ries. With alternatives such as these available, concerns about judicial 
administration cannot support a total ban on damages for emotional 
distress. 
Thus, the legitimate interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and society 
combine to favor the awarding of emotional distress damages in fraud 
cases. Although some courts continue to deny these damages, the ratio-
nales for denial articulated by those courts do nothing to undermine 
this conclusion. Some courts deny damages for emotional distress be-
cause they believe that such damages are never awarded in fraud cases. 
These courts assert that because fraud is an "economic" tort, damages 
should redress only the plaintiffs "pecuniary" injuries.134 These courts 
oversimplify the case law; a substantial body of precedent has permit-
ted the awarding of emotional distress damages in fraud cases.136 More-
over, the assertion that fraud damages protect only pecuniary interests 
is wholly conclusory; that some courts have limited fraud plaintiffs to 
economic damages does not explain why they have chosen to do so. 
Surely these courts cannot mean that fraud victims suffer only mone-
tary injury. Case law shows the emotional distress suffered by fraud 
victims.136 
Other courts have denied damages for emotional distress because 
these damages were not within the "contemplation of the parties."137 
These courts, however, have cited no empirical evidence for this prop-
osition.138 Especially in cases of consumer fraud, persons who have been 
defrauded may expect compensation for their frustration and mental 
anguish. Even in commercial cases these courts' argument rings hollow. 
Fraud is rarely within the contemplation of the innocent contracting 
party—otherwise the party would reject the bargain. To expect the de-
134. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
135. On the difficulties of establishing the real "majority'1 rule, see supra notes 11-15 and 
accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
137. See, e.g., Cornell v. Wunshel, 408 N.W.2d 379 (Iowa 1987). 
138. Some studies have suggested that the public underestimates the availability of compen-
sation for pain and suffering in tort litigation. See O'Connell & Simon, Payments for Pain and 
Suffering: Who Wants What, When, and Why?, 1972 U. I I I . L.F. 1, 20 (reporting that most auto-
mobile accident victims surveyed did not expect to receive an award for pain and suffering). If this 
study remains an accurate gauge of public perceptions, it may bolster the assumption that other 
tort victims do not expect to receive such awards. On the other hand, these data indicated only the 
public's misperception of the legal definition of compensable damages; most respondents believed 
that in fairness they should receive compensation for pain and suffering. Id. at 30. If an inquiry 
into the expectations of the parties becomes simply an inquiry into what the parties think the law 
is, the inquiry is irrelevant in determining whether a rule denying recovery should be changed. A 
defrauded person might guess accurately that the law in his state would deny recovery of emo-
tional distress damages. A person, however, might believe that the law is unfair in denying those 
damages. 
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frauded party to contemplate specifically not only the fraud, but also 
the emotional distress that will flow from the fraud, is unrealistic. 
More importantly, a measure of damages based on the "contempla-
tion of the parties" is an application of a contract principle rather than 
a tort standard.139 Damages in tort suits should be measured by proxi-
mate cause, not the parties' expectations.140 A different measure of con-
sequential damages is appropriate in contract cases because the law 
does not wish to discourage "efficient" breaches of contracts.141 Tort 
law, on the other hand, seeks to deter fraud, the antithesis of a bar-
gained-for exchange. Fraud is an independent tort action that impli-
cates tort policy.142 Fraud is not merely a suit for breach of contract 
dressed in the guise of tort. Using a contract standard to determine 
damages based on the "contemplation of the parties," therefore, is 
inappropriate. 
Finally, courts have justified denying emotional distress damages in 
fraud cases because, according to these courts, the purpose of fraud 
damages is only to return plaintiffs to the position they occupied before 
the fraud.143 Again, this rationale is merely a conclusory assertion. 
Moreover, the argument actually seems to support compensation for 
emotional distress. Recompensing economic loss alone does not return 
defrauded plaintiffs to their original position because it fails to redress 
the plaintiffs mental anguish. If courts truly wish to "return plaintiffs 
139. See, e.g., Scott v. Hurd-Corrigan Moving & Storage Co., 103 Mich. App. 322, 349, 302 
N.W.2d 867, 878 (1981) (stating that in a suit for breach of contract "the damages recoverable are 
those damages that arise naturally from the breach or which reasonably can be said to have been 
in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made"); Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Even contract cases often broaden the "contemplation of the par-
ties" limit to a test of foreseeability. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 876-77 (1982). The 
concept of foreseeability in contract law, however, "is a more severe limitation than is the require-
ment of substantial or 'proximate' cause" in tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 
comment a (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS]. 
140. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Dingmann, 251 Minn. 124, 127, 86 N.W.2d 499, 502 (1957) (stating 
that "the party guilty of the fraud is liable for all out-of-pocket-loss damages proximately caused 
by the fraud, even though the damages were not within the contemplation of the wrongdoer or his 
adversary"); see also R. DUNN, supra note 7, § 1.3, at 11-15 (stating that courts generally do not 
limit consequential damages in fraud actions to those within the contemplation of the parties, or 
even to those that were foreseeable). 
141. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (3d ed. 1986). Posner explains that the 
usual measure of damages in contract law seeks to satisfy "the objective of giving the promisor an 
incentive to fulfill his promise unless the result would be an inefficient use of resources." Id. at 108. 
Posner also advises one to "(n]otice how careful the law must be not to exceed compensatory 
damages if it does not want to deter efficient breaches." Id. When damage measures are uncertain, 
it will be difficult for a party contemplating breach to determine the rationally preferable course of 
action. 
142. Thus, for example, punitive damages are available under a tort theory of fraud, but not 
available for breach of contract. 
143. Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 52, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (1969). 
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to the position they occupied before the fraud/' courts should award a 
full measure of damages, including damages for emotional distress. 
B. Treating Fraud as a Dignitary Tort 
The change from denial to acceptance of emotional distress dam-
ages in fraud cases does not require radical overhaul of the law. Instead, 
it requires only that the courts perceive fraud not only as a pecuniary 
tort, but also as a dignitary tort. Courts should recognize that in a mod-
ern commercial society fraud is in part a dignitary tort. This shift in 
perception would bring fraud jurisprudence into line with other trends 
in modern tort law. 
All courts award emotional distress damages for certain dignitary 
wrongs, even absent any physical injury to the plaintiff. Torts such as 
assault, battery, and false imprisonment can be termed "dignitary" be-
cause successful plaintiffs may recover damages for emotional distress 
without proving any physical injury. Indeed, the victims of assault, bat-
tery, and false imprisonment may recover nominal damages as a means 
of assuaging their dignity even if they have suffered no physical or emo-
tional injury at all.144 
These traditional dignitary torts redress wrongs that would have 
been most common and keenly felt in England during the early devel-
opment of the common law. As our society has developed, however, citi-
zens have identified a new range of activities as assaulting their dignity. 
Courts have responded to this development by recognizing new digni-
tary torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress146 and 
invasion of privacy.146 All these torts, virtually unknown before the 
twentieth century, compensate emotional and dignitary harms, rather 
than economic or physical loss. 
Just as courts have not hesitated to recognize entirely new digni-
tary torts, neither should they be reluctant to acknowledge that an 
older tort action, such as fraud, may have a dignitary aspect. Common-
law courts are free to rework an old conception of fraud in light of fresh 
144. In a related sense, actions such as libel and slander per se are dignitary torts. Within 
first amendment limits, the common law permits jurors to award substantial presumed damages 
even without proof of actual injury to reputation. 
145. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
146. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 
647 (1970). Courts continue to recognize new tort actions in which recovery for emotional distress 
is an important element of damages. See, e.g., Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1446 (1982) (stating that mental distress is "the major injury in many breach 
of confidence cases"); Note, Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing 
Recognition of Extra-Contract Damages, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1421, 1422-23 (1986) (stating that an in-
surer's bad faith refusal to settle with its insured may permit the insured to recover damages for 
emotional distress). 
1989] DIGNITARY TORTS 31 
policy views.147 Citizens today are as likely to suffer distress from com-
mercial deception as from bodily assault or false imprisonment.148 
Rather than ignoring the claims of fraud plaintiffs who have suffered 
substantial frustration or perhaps severe emotional distress, courts 
should recognize that fraud is at least in part a dignitary tort and 
should award damages for that distress. 
Allowing recovery for emotional distress in fraud actions does not 
mean that all defrauded plaintiffs automatically will recover those dam-
ages. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that their distress is genuine, 
and jurors may reject as inherently improbable any claims for substan-
tial emotional distress based upon trivial harms. In addition, just as 
battery requires contact, assault requires apprehension, and false im-
prisonment requires confinement, fraud requires proof of some underly-
ing financial injury.149 Courts may maintain the traditional elements of 
147. New Jersey's Supreme Court recently decided to award nominal damages in actions for 
fraud even without proof of a specific amount of loss, so long as the plaintiff established "some 
loss, detriment, or injury." Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48, 477 A.2d 
1224, 1229-30 (1984). In endorsing the availability of nominal damages in a fraud action, the court 
determined that the traditional insistence on proof of compensatory damages was based more on 
outmoded historical distinctions between the old English writs than on any considered policy judg-
ment. Id. at 52, 477 A.2d at 1232. A similar fresh look valuing policy over history is appropriate in 
determining whether emotional distress damages are appropriate. 
Refining fraud damages to include compensation for emotional distress is not inconsistent 
with recent legislative reforms of tort damages. See statutes cited supra note 2. Those reform 
statutes impose ceilings—typically very high ceilings—on emotional distress damages to prevent 
runaway jury verdicts; they do not deny these damages entirely. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
549.23 (West 1988) (limiting damages for intangible loss in civil actions to $400,000); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1988) (capping damages for noneconomic loss in personal injury ac-
tions at $875,000). Moreover, some of the statutes are explicitly limited to negligence claims and 
do not purport to cover intentional torts. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1988) (placing 
$500,000 cap on damages for noneconomic losses in personal injury claims based on negligence); 
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 663-8.5, -8.7 (Supp. 1987) (applying $375,000 cap to actual physical pain and 
suffering, but not to other mental anguish and not to any intentional torts). Other statutes limit 
damages only in medical malpractice litigation, in which a particular insurance crisis has prompted 
passage of these measures. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1988) (limiting damages 
for noneconomic loss in medical negligence cases to $250,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 
1983) (limiting patient's recovery for injury or death to $500,000). 
148. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 42 (8th ed. 1970) (stating that "[i]t is proba-
ble . . . that fraud is the most prevalent crime in America"). Comparative statistics are not readily 
available because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does not include fraud in its statistical 
index of crime. The FBI excludes the various forms of fraud "not because they are unimportant 
predations but because they are difficult for the police to know about very fully, and because they 
are often difficult to count even when much detail on them is known." HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 
62 (D. Glaser ed. 1974). 
149. See, e.g., Berkel & Co. Contractors v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984); 
Downer v. Bramet, 152 Cal. App. 3d 837, 199 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1984); Courtney v. Feldstein, 147 
Mich. App. 70, 382 N.VV.2d 734 (1985); Jurcich v. General Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595, 600-01 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Courts recognizing emotional distress damages for fraud have done so to 
grant full compensation for misconduct that the law has deemed independently tortious and ac-
tionable; the plaintiff must establish all elements of a cause .of action for fraud, including some 
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a cause of action for fraud while redefining the scope of damages recov-
erable by plaintiffs who establish that cause of action. Proximate cause 
limits also will protect defendants against far-fetched claims of emo-
tional distress that are tied to the fraud more by the ingenuity of the 
plaintiffs imagination than by a reasonable response.150 
C. Evaluating the Qualified Approaches 
As previously discussed, some courts have suggested the imposition 
of further limits on a plaintiffs ability to recover for emotional distress 
in fraud cases.151 A careful examination of four such limiting ap-
proaches reveals that none of them serves the policies identified 
above.152 
1. Requiring Severe Distress 
Some courts have required fraud plaintiffs to establish that their 
distress was particularly severe in order to recover compensation for 
that distress.153 At first glance this approach appears to represent a sen-
sible compromise between absolute rules that either allow or deny dam-
ages for emotional distress. Further reflection, however, demonstrates 
the difficulties with this restriction. A requirement of substantial emo-
tional distress requires the court or jury to mark an uncertain boundary 
between serious mental anguish and lesser emotional upset or disap-
pointment. The cases themselves indicate that this line is difficult to 
draw; jurors and judges often disagree,154 and a court may find similar 
testimony showing emotional distress adequate in one case and inade-
quate in the next case.155 To demand proof of severe emotional distress, 
pecuniary harm. On the other hand, those few courts that have decided to allow an action for 
purely nominal fraud damages even without proof of specific, quantifiable damage, see cases cited 
supra note 105, appropriately might permit jurors to award compensation for emotional distress 
even absent specific proof of financial injury. 
Cases of deception unaccompanied by financial injury may, of course, support claims of emo-
tional distress if the deception or "fraud" is a means of accomplishing another recognized tort (for 
example, a battery committed through fraudulently obtained consent), or is conduct that satisfies 
the independent, stringent standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
150. See Cable v. Hechler, 532 F. Supp. 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the defend-
ant's allegedly fraudulent stock market transactions were not the proximate cause of the injury to 
the plaintiffs reputation that occurred when the defendant's transactions triggered an inquiry by 
the American Stock Exchange; the plaintifTs misleading answers during this inquiry inspired an 
investigation of the plaintiff by the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
151. See supra notes 26-74 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 114-50 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra note 34. 
155. See supra note 34. Perhaps some of the diverse results reached in similar cases may be 
reconciled by reference to the plaintifTs ability or inability to establish objective symptoms of 
emotional distress, such as headaches or loss of sleep. On the other hand, the jurisdiction that 
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therefore, burdens trial and appellate courts with a factual dispute to 
which no clear guidelines apply and opens the door to inconsistent reso-
lutions of the issue.156 
Moreover, a required quantum of emotional distress is not neces-
sary to protect the interests of defendants. When emotional distress is 
minimal, the jury will award only modest damages.167 Indeed, a prereq-
uisite of serious emotional distress might work against defendants' in-
terests by encouraging plaintiffs to overstate the degree of their 
emotional distress in order to satisfy the judicial standard.158 
Finally, the traditional dignitary torts such as assault, battery, and 
false imprisonment do not require plaintiffs to prove that their distress 
meets a higher standard of severity.169 These torts redress emotional 
injury and protect the plaintiffs dignity even when the emotional dis-
tress is slight. The extent of the mental distress dictates the extent of 
most clearly has required serious distress in fraud cases currently does not require proof of severe 
distress by objective symptomology from plaintiffs who bring suit under other tort theories such as 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 
1987). 
156. A requirement of particularly substantial emotional distress, of course, might discourage 
some plaintiffs from introducing any evidence of emotional distress and enable courts to dismiss 
other claims for emotional distress based on the pleadings. This preservation of judicial time, how-
ever, is unlikely to outweigh the time spent litigating the severity of emotional distress issue in 
both trial and appellate courts. Once plaintiffs have expended the time and money necessary to 
come to court, they have an incentive to litigate any issue that might increase their monetary 
recovery. 
157. When the jury grants an award greater than the amount that the judge believes reasona-
bly can be awarded, the judge can order remittitur or a new trial. The judge need not deny all 
recovery. Moreover, judges should consider a substantial jury award as an indication that ordinary 
individuals do not regard the plaintiffs distress as an insubstantial frustration unworthy of 
recovery. 
158. Cf. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 652 (stating that the requirement that plaintiffs establish 
physical symptoms of severe distress in a negligent infliction case is undesirable because it encour-
ages victims to exaggerate symptoms). 
159. See, e.g., Clark v. I.H. Rubenstein, Inc., 335 So. 2d 545 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (awarding 
S500 to compensate the plaintiff for embarrassment resulting from a mistaken accusation of shop-
lifting, even though the plaintiff was detained wrongfully for only five minutes and was treated 
courteously); Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 91 N.W.2d 756 (1958) (awarding $1,000 to com-
pensate a police officer for "ribbing" and kidding from his friends after the officer had suffered 
only lost buttons in an assault). In general, cases that address these torts state no express require-
ment that distress be particularly serious or severe. In contrast, courts that have articulated special 
standards for serious distress in developing the torts of negligent and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress have been particularly careful to announce requirements of severe distress. See 
supra note 77 and accompanying text. These courts, presumably, have found it important to em-
phasize this quantum of distress requirement because the law generally has not required a particu-
lar level of emotional distress in order to extend compensation. 
A rule that would eliminate recovery for modest amounts of distress resulting from torts such 
as assault, battery, and false imprisonment might be largely meaningless in any event, because 
jurors are permitted to award nominal damages for these torts even without a showing of injury. 
See, e.g., Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983) (allowing the plaintiff to recover nomi-
nal damages for battery even though the act was harmless). 
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recovery, but does not mark the difference between recovery and denial 
of all emotional distress damages. Similarly, courts should recompense 
a fraud plaintiff's* mental distress without requiring a threshold of 
severity. 
Most jurisdictions demand proof of severe emotional distress 
before allowing recovery for intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.160 The special policy considerations that shaped the re-
quirements for these torts, however, do not apply to fraud cases. Fraud 
is a traditional, well-established tort, not a novel theory of recovery. 
Recognizing recovery for modest emotional distress, therefore, will not 
create claims for plaintiffs who otherwise would not have had a cause of 
action. Moreover, the requirement of pecuniary harm already limits the 
number of plaintiffs who may sue successfully for fraud. In this context, 
an additional requirement of severe emotional harm serves no useful 
purpose. 
On the other hand, courts in a few jurisdictions have hinted that 
they may require substantial distress even in traditional dignitary tort 
actions.161 Texas cases that require a high degree of mental anguish in 
fraud cases may be justified as an application of a general rule that 
Texas courts have applied to other dignitary torts.162 In jurisdictions 
such as Texas, however, the policy analysis suggested above163 provides 
a basis for relaxing the requirement of severe emotional distress in all 
dignitary tort cases. 
2. Requiring Substantial Pecuniary Harm 
Some courts have limited recovery of emotional distress damages 
for fraud to plaintiffs who can establish that their pecuniary damages 
were substantial.164 This requirement may mean only that the plaintiff 
must prove the minimal pecuniary harm necessary to state a claim for 
fraud.165 If so, the requirement adds little of value to the legal analysis. 
160. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
161. See Campbell v. Jenkins, 43 Colo. App. 458, 460, 608 P.2d 363, 364 (1979) (concerning 
assault; fright will not support a compensatory damage award unless the fright is serious enough to 
cause physical symptoms such as nausea, headaches, or mental distress; the court borrowed this 
requirement from a case that announced the requirements for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress); Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 213 (Mont. 1984) (concerning false 
imprisonment). 
162. See, e.g, Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc., v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) 
(concerning slander); Trevino v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1979) (concerning invasion of privacy). 
163. See supra notes 114-50, 157-58 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
165. See Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 
(1975). This court suggested that "interference with one's legally protected interests is sufficient 
damage to satisfy the [substantial damage] test . . . and to guard against potentially fraudulent 
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If, on the other hand, these courts want the plaintiff to establish a high 
degree of pecuniary harm before recovering emotional distress damages, 
this approach poses several problems. First, attempting to distinguish 
substantial from insubstantial pecuniary loss creates the same difficul-
ties as trying to distinguish serious from slight emotional distress. Par-
ties will consume valuable court time debating the value of the 
plaintiff's financial loss, and both judges and juries will reach conflicting 
conclusions on whether a particular loss qualifies as substantial. Thus, 
society's interest in efficient judicial administration disfavors a require-
ment of substantial pecuniary loss. 
Nor is this limitation necessary to protect a defendant's interest in 
avoiding vexatious litigation and burdensome liability. Absent serious 
financial damage, the plaintiff is unlikely to pursue an action for fraud 
or obtain a large damage award. Jurors will be skeptical of plaintiffs' 
claims that trivial financial losses triggered severe emotional distress. A 
requirement of substantial pecuniary injury, therefore, is largely 
unnecessary. 
Traditional dignitary torts do not link recovery for emotional dis-
tress to a particular quantum of physical or economic harm. A plaintiff 
in a battery action, for example, can recover for humiliation and anger 
even if the defendant's offensive touching did not cause the slightest 
physical harm.166 Courts in these cases have recognized that emotional 
distress is an independent harm that deserves compensation despite the 
absence of other injuries. Similarly, the plaintiffs key to recovery of 
emotional distress damages in fraud actions should be proof of the un-
derlying elements of fraud. Once the plaintiff has established those ele-
ments, the availability of emotional distress damages should rest on the 
plaintiffs ability to prove the harm, not on the extent of the plaintiffs 
financial loss. 
3. Distinguishing Personal Frauds from Business Frauds 
Some courts have denied compensation in business fraud cases by 
suggesting a distinction that would deny emotional distress damages in 
emotional distress claims." Id. at 937, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484. The court opined that any further 
requirement of damage would "add little to the guarantee of genuineness." Id. The court's discus-
sion of this issue, however, is dictum, because the plaintiff established substantial financial injury 
of S170 for loss of property use and $7,100 for attorney's fees in an action to quiet title. Id. at 937 
n.ll, 938, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484 n.ll, 485. 
166. See, e.g., Whitley v. Andersen, 37 Colo. App. 486, 488, 551 P.2d 1083, 1085 (1976); 
Southern Fin. Co. v. Alexander, 113 Ga. App. 740, 149 S.E.2d 526 (1966); Green v. Washington 
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 259 Md. 206, 269 A.2d 815 (1970); Conway v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. 
Co., 234 Mo. App. 596, 125 S.W.2d 935 (1939); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 
627 (Tex. 1967); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Musgrove, 153 Va. 348, 149 S.E. 453 (1929) (concerning bat-
tery and false imprisonment). 
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business fraud cases, but allow them for other kinds of fraud.167 A dis-
tinction between business frauds and personal frauds, however, is 
largely unworkable. Some frauds, such as those involving promises of 
marriage or the mishandling of funeral arrangements, are clearly per-
sonal.168 Deception in the sale of personal insurance may also be per-
sonal, because "a primary consideration in purchasing insurance is the 
peace of mind and security it will provide when the contingency insured 
against arises."169 On the other hand, how should one classify an em-
ployee's claim that he was defrauded into executing a contract under 
which he gave up five years' worth of back wages;170 or a small inves-
tor's claim that a securities fraud destroyed her family's financial secur-
ity;171 or a real estate owner's claim that she was induced to sell a piece 
of commercial property by misrepresentations that catered to her dis-
tinctive religious beliefs?172 If courts adhere to a distinction between 
business and personal frauds, adjudication of these claims will burden 
the courts with lengthy debates over whether the transaction was of a 
business or personal nature. 
In most cases, moreover, the plaintiffs legitimate interests strongly 
favor recovery, regardless of the business nature of the fraud. Consumer 
purchases are business transactions, but are rife with the potential to 
inflict severe frustration on a defrauded consumer. It is certainly fore-
seeable that a person who is deceived into purchasing a termite-infested 
dwelling or paying thousands of dollars for a defective automobile will 
suffer substantial distress. To deny recovery in these cases would leave 
plaintiffs badly undercompensated. 
167. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. 
168. Recognition of the availability of emotional distress damages in fraud may be less im-
portant to these types of claims because a court will be more likely to find that these facts satisfy 
the "outrageousness" standard for a separate action for intentional or reckless infliction of emo-
tional distress. Moreover, many courts have granted emotional distress recovery for these kinds of 
"noncommercial" contracts on the basis of breach of contract, even absent proof of fraud. See 
Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS, supra note 
139, § 353. 
169. Jarchow, 48 Cal. App. 3d at 940, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (endorsing the award of emo-
tional distress damages for the insurer's breach of an implied covenant of good faith). 
170. In Moore v. Slonim, 426 F. Supp. 524 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977), the 
court judged these facts to constitute "business" fraud. 
171. In Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1167 (10th 
Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983), a brokerage firm argued that it should not be respon-
sible for emotional distress suffered by a defrauded client because the underlying tort was only a 
"business fraud." The court evinced no interest in a distinction between business and other frauds, 
and therefore made no attempt to categorize the securities fraud claim as one or the other. One 
could argue that securities fraud claims by brokerage firm clients against stockbrokers should be 
treated as claims of consumer fraud. 
172. C/. Newman v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22, 18 P. 791 (1888) (not clear whether the real estate was 
commercial or residential). 
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Even victims of more purely commercial frauds may experience se-
rious mental anguish. Individuals who imperil either a child's college 
education or a secure retirement by staking their savings in a fraudu-
lent investment scheme surely suffer emotional distress. Proprietors of 
small businesses likewise experience mental despair when their busi-
nesses are threatened. The test for recovery of emotional distress 
should be the foreseeability of distress rather than an artificial distinc-
tion between business contexts and other contexts.173 
Finally, this foreseeability test adequately protects the interests of 
defendants in fraud cases. If the defendant can foresee emotional dis-
tress to the plaintiff, the defendant should be accountable for that dis-
tress, no matter how sophisticated the plaintiff or how commercial the 
setting of the fraud. Entrance into the business world surely does not 
amount to an assumption of risk that requires one to suppress feelings 
against illegal and oppressive conduct; free enterprise should never be a 
license to cheat others. A case-by-case consideration of whether the de-
fendant's misconduct was likely to cause emotional disturbance more 
fairly balances the interests of plaintiffs and defendants than does an 
approach that separates business and personal frauds.174 
4. Awarding Emotional Distress Damages as a Part of Punitive 
Damages 
Some jurisdictions may deny emotional distress damages as a sepa-
rate category of recovery in fraud cases, but permit jurors to award 
173. A more technical distinction might suggest that individuals could not recover for busi-
ness frauds in which their corporate entities were swindled. Thus, one court denied the president 
(and apparent founder) of a corporation the right to seek recovery for the emotional distress he 
suffered when an insurance company allegedly defrauded him into signing a release. Gibbs v. Jef-
ferson-Pilot Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 544, 343 S.E.2d 758 (1986). The court reasoned 
that the president could not sue individually to recover damages for his mental anguish based on 
fraud because "he admits he procured the insurance for his corporations for the benefit of the 
corporations and signed the releases as president of the corporations.,, Id. at 545, 343 S.E.2d at 
759. Presumably, the court's opinion foreclosed any recovery of emotional distress damages; al-
though corporations are fictional legal "persons," they feel no pain. See Ailetcher v. Beneficial Fin. 
Co., 2 Haw. App. 301, 632 P.2d 1071 (1981); Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Monroe Eng'g Assoc, 430 
So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that corporate plaintiffs cannot experience mental dis-
tress); In re James Noel Flying Serw, 61 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986). 
Perhaps one can justify this result as one burden accepted by an entrepreneur in exchange for 
the benefits of doing business in the corporate form. To deny the legitimacy of the anguish suf-
fered by the founder and president of a corporation because he chose to file a corporate certificate 
with the secretary of state's office rather than to do business as an unincorporated proprietor, 
however, does seem to ignore the realities of reasonable human reactions. 
174. For an example of a court that adopted this case-by-case approach, see Baker v. Ameri-
can States Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a worker's fraud 
claim against an insurance company stated a claim on which relief could be granted for emotional 
distress). 
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those damages surreptitiously as part of punitive damages.176 This prac-
tice does not serve well the legitimate interests of either plaintiffs or 
defendants. Plaintiffs lose the opportunity to present concrete evidence 
of their emotional distress and to urge the jury to compensate that in-
jury. Likewise, defendants have no chance to counter the plaintiffs 
proof of emotional distress or to exhort the jury to minimize those dam-
ages. When damages for emotional distress are awarded furtively as an 
unspecified part of the punitive damage award, jurors may vastly un-
derestimate or overestimate the plaintiffs injury. 
Nor does the practice of awarding emotional distress damages as 
part of punitive damages foster efficient, evenhanded judicial adminis-
tration. Courts cannot review the suitability of emotional distress dam-
ages when those damages are hidden as unstated components of 
punitive damage awards. Moreover, to permit the inflation of punitive 
damage awards in this manner further undermines the credibility of the 
judicial system in the eyes of critics who continually attack large puni-
tive damage awards. Recognizing emotional distress as a separate item 
of compensation in fraud cases not only would benefit plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and courts, but also would end needless speculation over 
whether a generous measure of punitive damages included compensa-
tion for mental anguish. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Woody Guthrie observed in song that "[s]ome will rob you with a 
six gun, and some with a fountain pen."176 The law always has compen-
sated victims of armed robbery for their mental distress, but many 
courts have been unwilling to extend that relief to the targets of more 
genteel extortions. The modern focus on compensation for dignitary 
harms, combined with a recognition that fraud victims suffer distress 
ranging from anger to debilitating anguish, suggests that the distinction 
between fraud victims and victims of other wrongful acts is outdated. 
In a commercial society, wrongdoers may violate individual integrity by 
pen point as well as by gun point. By acknowledging the dignitary di-
mension of fraud and allowing recovery of emotional distress damages 
in fraud cases, courts will better serve both the compensatory and de-
terrent functions of tort law. 
175. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text. 
176. Guthrie, Pretty Boy Floyd, in A. LOMAX, FOLK SONGS OF NORTH AMERICA 437 (1960). 
